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Abstract

Rising global opinions on security of vulnerable nuclear materials at research reactor facilities
against misuse and acquisition by terrorist or violent groups has led to the implementation of the
enrichment reduction program focused at reducing enrichment in fuel from about 90% to less
than 20%. This program has provided an extraordinary prospect of improving international
security to counter the fears of direct use of HEU materials acquired from these facilities for nonpeaceful purposes. Ongoing efforts by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) through
the Reduced Enrichment in Test and Research Reactors (RETRR) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) supports countries to develop and adapt better technical capabilities
targeted towards this program. This research enumerated and compared the amount of weaponusable materials that the reactor produced in both the HEU and LEU fuel at varying time
intervals of operation from a simulated neutronic model of the Nigeria Research Reactor (NIRR1) developed with SCALE and ORIGEN code. Consequently, result obtained showed that
weapon-usable 239Pu balance for LEU fuel compared to HEU increased linearly about 10-fold as
the number of days of operation increases. This 239Pu growth was strongly considered for the
ongoing conversion of Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) as a case study because of
the concern that out of the nine licensed prototype MNSR worldwide, four are in China, the
origin of the design but the other five are in Ghana, Iran, Nigeria Pakistan and Syria. These five
countries have well organized terrorist or violent groups that could potentially acquire nuclear
materials or sabotage these facilities to disperse radiological materials which should be a call to
more action for more security as well as international safeguards and accounting for nuclear
materials. Additionally, based on the outcome of this simulation, as well as the vulnerability
assessment carried out that included seeming capabilities of terrorist groups operating near the
vi

NIRR-1 facility, security risk and safeguards were evaluated, and suggestions were made on
security risk of the increasing quantity of weapon-usable 239Pu isotope.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The global resolve to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and the eventual
elimination of such material from research reactors altogether is seen as an approach at reducing
risk and the perceived possibility that nuclear materials from one or more of these research
reactor facilities may one day be advertently acquired and used by any terrorist group known or
operating on a global pedestal [1] to produce nuclear weapon or construct a radiological dispersal
device (RDD). Though, the use of HEU in research and test reactors has raised security concerns,
even though they are considerably smaller in terms of power and waste generation than power
reactors [2] [3]. Beside the security concerns, research reactors are considerably smaller in terms
of energy output, operation, and waste generation [4], but there have been concerns due to the
extent of security and safeguards applicable to nuclear materials and the facilities globally
compared to those obtainable at power reactor facilities. Nevertheless, under the IAEA guidance,
[5] it is a requirement that all member states must implement relevant and objective measures to
secure, safeguard, and counter all credible perceived risks of non-peaceful application of nuclear
technologies and associated materials in all its ramifications. This includes efforts by the agency
to support, develop, and adapt better technical capabilities targeted towards converting all HEU
fueled reactors with lower enriched uranium (LEU) fuels of less than 20% enrichment. HEU is
defined as the uranium type in which the isotopic concentration of 235U is 20% or higher (natural
uranium ore consists of 0.7% 235U) [6]. The term research reactor includes critical and subcritical
facilities [7] used in stimulation and measurement of effects of radiation on metals in the nuclear
rocket environment [8], generation and production of neutron flux, ionizing radiation and related
experimental instruments [9]. 239Pu is the most suitable isotope used in weapon production [10],
1

the isotope is produced by transmutation of 238U isotope that is exposed to neutron radiation at
lower kinetic energy. The 238U is subjected to two 𝛽ˉ decays, and as the isotope loses electron,
the initial 𝛽ˉ decay transmutes the 239Pu isotope to 239Np while the second 𝛽ˉ transmutes the
239

Np into 239Pu [10].

238
92𝑈

+

1
0𝑛

→ 239
92𝑈 →

239
92𝑁𝑝

→

239
92𝑃𝑢

equation 1.1

Meanwhile, the core of the NIRR-1 MNSR is projected to be converted to LEU fuel with UO2
Zircalloy, it is expected that the initial 9.0 wt% of 238U isotopic content in the HEU fuel will
substantially increase to about 87.05 wt% in the UO2. As it is anticipated, the reasonable amount
of 238U isotope present in the LEU fuel matrix can produce plutonium isotopes including the
240

Pu, but when the quantity of 240Pu exceeds 7% measure of the total plutonium isotope, such

matrix is said to be bad and not good enough weapon material.
Correspondingly, the vulnerability and proliferation of nuclear materials in research and test
reactors can be exploited due to the high volume of 239Pu that may be produced in the spent fuel
from such a facility by any proliferant state. In view of the vulnerability evaluation of research
reactor facilities as mostly located in developing countries like Nigeria, it may as well attract a
very high consequence in terms of environmental hazard from the fall-out of radioactive
dispersal in case of attack by violent or terrorist groups, since 239Pu produces high and energetic
radioactivity with a half-life of 24100 years.
Furthermore, the production of high-purity weapon-usable 239Pu metal grade is best when lower
enriched fuel is exposed for a few days of reactor operation, after which the chemical separation
methodology process could be used to separate the 239Pu from the other elements [10]. It is
2

worthy to note that even though the NIRR-1 MNSR facility used as a case study is a compact
core model, the production of 239Pu from a lower enriched fuel is still technically a wellintentioned subject matter since the research reactor operates an average of 2.5 hours per day
every week. This situation puts the facility in the class of reactor that can produce more amount
of high-purity weapon-usable 239Pu metal grade based on the quantity of 238U present in
candidate LEU fuel.

1.1 General Concept and Approach for Safeguards and Security of Nuclear
Materials
The international safeguards application takes measures to prevent the spread, and timely
detection in case of theft or diversion, of a significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear materials through
full implementation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) agreement. This has been one of the
cardinal objectives of the IAEA international safeguards and verification regime. The IAEA
makes sure that all commitments to the NPT agreement are adhered to by verification and
safeguards of nuclear materials and technology to accomplish nuclear disarmament. The NPT
agreement came into force in 1970 and has been ratified by 190 state parties with the
responsibility to promote strict adherence to the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear
materials. Accordingly, Article III of the NPT requires the applicability of the IAEA safeguards
to all sources or special fissionable materials within the member state’s territory, jurisdiction,
and control [11]. For all IAEA safeguards and verification, complying with the requirements
may also involve measures to fulfil the Additional Protocol (AP) if it was ratified by the state.
This measure entails the collection of design information and environmental samples at different
locations even beyond the facility [11] as deemed fit by the inspectors.

3

Establishing the inventory and having full knowledge of the strength of materials and the facility
under the IAEA safeguards is of the utmost importance to all the cardinal oversite of the agency.
The information on elements and their isotopes contained in the inventory is referred to as the
source term, and this presents a gateway to understanding the extent, needed level(s) of
protection, vulnerabilities, and safety of operations needed at any facility. Besides the
importance of the source term to safeguards, the IAEA guidance and Safety Report Series No. 53
also recommends that it is important to analyze and determine the source term including its
radiological consequences for all nuclear and radiological facilities to guarantee safety of people,
materials, and the environment [4].

1.2 Limitations of existing control and accountability for safeguards and security
of nuclear materials in research reactors
The IAEA verifies compliance to safeguards using non-destructive assay to corroborate all
reactor data provided by the facility through the state, as well as physical inspection at intervals
for inventory of different nuclear materials. A state proliferating or planning to proliferate may
hide data from inventory transmitted to the IAEA.
Beside the application of international safeguards as a measure of compliance to the protection of
nuclear materials and facilities, varieties of strategies have been proposed centered around
enrichment reduction. Nevertheless, material attractiveness at lower enrichment may increase
due to enrichment reduction. Non-state actors with less capability but with the intention of
creating panic, disrupting, or acquiring materials to produce RDD, may easily be attracted to the
facility. The attempt to divert materials by disgruntled personnel may also increase due to the
perceived lowering of risk associated with the new enrichment.
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There is also increasing concern that most strategies put forward by DOE, IAEA, and other
stakeholders failed to place emphasis on the risk some of these facilities face operating in certain
regions of the globe irrespective of the level of enrichment obtainable in those facilities.
Consideration of the role that human elements play in security, risk mitigation, and management
will be an asset to global security. Furthermore, the express understanding of uniqueness in
culture in terms of tradition, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption, religious beliefs, administrative
process, administration of justice system, policy, and legal framework that supports the
sustenance of global strategies in these regions will go further to appreciate facility risks and
other misunderstandings.
But there are concerns about assigning strategic value to the risk at all levels of enrichment and
the notion that such material becomes more attractive even at lower enrichments, which now
raises more concerns about material vulnerabilities attributes attached to nuclear materials at
different enrichment levels and projected elevated proliferation risks as the fuel transits from
HEU to LEU. According to a “Risk Metric” developed by Glaser which established that “very
roughly, a reduction of the fuel enrichment from 93 % to 45 % cuts the attractiveness by about
40 %, while a reduction from 93 % to 20 % cuts the attractiveness by almost 70 %, compared
to W-HEU,” as well as the fact that the technical requirements will make it practically
impossible to manufacture nuclear weapons at enrichment levels below 20% [12]. The Glaser
metric, however, failed to evaluate the increase in weapon-usable 239Pu in LEU fuel materials
after reducing the enrichment from 93% to 20% as well as the justification of the scale of
difference in the 239Pu balance between HEU and LEU.
The enrichment reduction program has provided an extraordinary prospect of improving
international security as well as relieving the fears of direct use of HEU materials acquired from

5

these research reactors for non-peaceful purposes. However, bearing in mind the increase in 238U
isotopic content in HEU from 9.0 wt% to 87.05 wt% in LEU and the fact that this noticeable
increase will give rise to weapon-usable 239Pu in spent fuel of the LEU should be a big source of
concern for the enrichment reduction program as well as international safeguards and accounting
for nuclear materials.
Granting the understanding that technical requirements will make it nearly impossible to
manufacture nuclear weapons as enrichments reduces farther below 20%. At this point, it may be
easy to assume that reducing fuel enrichment from 93% to 20% cuts the material attractiveness
by almost 70%, but, alternatively, it is also believed that reduced enrichment may warrant lesser
or easier adversary capabilities to obtain nuclear materials as the extent of required safety and
security protocols for such materials diminishes. Cutting material attractiveness by almost 70%
will not eliminate in entirety the possibility that material could be accessed in whatever form or
shape by (i) a disgruntled employee acting for self or in collusion with an outsider, (ii) a terrorist
invasion of susceptible secured facility and (iii) other material vulnerabilities.
Nonetheless, to an adversary or non-state actor, obtaining materials in any form or shape and
accessing or disrupting facility operations with the attendant media attention is a success. To
date, widely held global opinions on security of vulnerable nuclear materials at the research
reactor facilities from misuse and acquisition by terrorist organizations worldwide has led to the
implementation of the conversion program focused on reducing the enrichment in fuel from
about 90% to less than 20%. Since the conversion program is an extensively accepted initiative
worldwide, all the requisite risk assessment, material attractiveness, and vulnerabilities
associated with each materials type, enrichment, facility, location, and the general adherence to
both national and international regulations on material control and accounting for all levels of
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enrichment should be standardized to the extent practical when planning or implementing global
nuclear material security.
Essentially, risk and material attractiveness, including their figure of merit (FOM), must be
assigned to materials based on local, regional, and international threats to each facility.
Additionally, more comprehensive methodologies, as well as adequate information gathering
techniques for benchmarking procedures that cuts across the conduct for safety, security and
safeguard for the stockpiled vulnerable nuclear materials at research reactor facilities worldwide,
must established as a means of promoting global nuclear materials security.
The safeguard and security objectives in the context of this research are expected to develop
capabilities that helps to avert the stealing or diversion of nuclear material, compare risk inherent
in the reduced enrichment, as well as the safety of personnel and environment within and outside
of the research reactor facility through the inventory of source term that will be obtained by
utilizing the Oak Ridge Isotope GENeration (ORIGEN) capabilities in the Standardized
Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) code suite.

1.3 Importance of source term inventory to international safeguards and security
of nuclear materials for research reactors
Nuclear materials inventories are measured using different techniques like counting physical
items, detectors, on-site measurements, analysis of environmental samples, and many more [13].
Nevertheless, the enumerated techniques may not be enough to prevent clandestine operations by
any facility when a total commitment and proof of adherence to international safeguards,
including securing nuclear materials against clandestine operations, is desirable.
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Apart from the importance of source term inventory to safeguards and security, the acquisition
and potential threat of dispersal of small amounts of plutonium in the air in the form of dust or
aerosol by an adversary or terrorist group would be politically and economically impactful
without the fore-knowledge of its radiotoxicity and characteristics that can inform emergency
response and the eventual clean-up.
A more detailed source term inventory, then, becomes very important and strategic to the
ongoing conversion programs worldwide. The inventory will provide more detailed elemental
and isotopic parameters that could make diversions, deviations, or accidents more easily
detectable when further environmental and elemental analysis are carried out. Source term is the
quantity of radioactive material expected to be released during normal reactor operations. It is
reported on a per isotope basis, and the knowledge plays a critical role in safety analysis of
reactors during and after normal operations. The extent, composition, and pattern of activity
release can be simulated under different conditions to understand the degree of challenges that
radiological hazards may present [14], or to detect any deviation from normal operations that
may lead to non-peaceful application. Additionally, the conduct and evaluation of source term is
a requirement to establish a national system of control, accounting, emergency response plan,
and safety and security of nuclear materials. Furthermore, it is used for the conduct and
postulation of radioactive releases for design base accident (DBA) analysis. The information
contained in the analysis can provide evidence of operational consistency or otherwise when
compared with initial information provided by state or facility during on-site or off-site
evaluations of trace elements in environmental samples, as well as during accident analysis.
For research reactors, the knowledge of source term became very significant in safeguards and
security of materials because of the several irradiation channels in the design that could
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accommodate clandestine and undeclared materials processing. Even though international
safeguards permit the use of the tamper indicating device (TID) for facilities under the IAEA
safeguards, it is challenging to have TIDs on the all the irradiation channels for regulatory
oversite. Additionally, the usage patterns of research reactors are much less regular than powerproducing reactors, which complicates analyses.
Nigeria is one of the countries operating an HEU fueled research reactor. The reactor is a
Chinese manufactured MNSR that can produce weapon grade material, though in a very small
quantity. The Nigeria Research Reactor (called NIRR-1) is undergoing conversion from HEU
(UA14-A1) to LEU (UO2, Zircalloy). The conduct and evaluation of source term and inventories
for NIRR-1 are very significant for operational safety, amendment of legislation, and the
eventual renewal of the operating license of the new LEU fuel. Additionally, the evaluation of
source term from the NIRR-1 facility will reveal the composition pattern of radioactivity release
under different conditions that can help plan for the readiness and the prevention of radiological
hazards as the HEU core is removed from the reactor. The knowledge of source term inventory
will help develop the HEU core shielding with the respective safeguard’s expectation for storage
and secure transportation of unirradiated and irradiated HEU at the end of the present HEU core
life.

1.4 Background
According to the IAEA database shown in (Figure 1.1), there are about 273 research reactors in
59 countries around the world used for teaching and training purposes; there are 14 sited in
Africa and they are expected to continue to play a leading role in advancement as well as
improvement of human wellbeing [15]. Additionally, they will remain influential to the growth
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of nuclear technology use in agriculture engineering [16], education and training, basic science,
materials development, and radioisotope production for medicine, industry, computer code
validation, elemental analyses, and radiochemistry [17] [18] [19] [20]. The term research reactor
includes critical and subcritical facilities [7] used in stimulation and measurement of effects of
radiation on metals in the nuclear rocket environment [8].
Globally, the direct impact of utilization of research reactors are seen in the expansion of basic
scientific systems, advancement, and enactment of viable research and technology policies that
supports the transition of breakthrough from theory to reality. Research reactors are also used to
generate neutron flux as well as experimental radiation for research and development [21]. A
typical research reactor core has a small volume with powers less than 5 MW(t). In most cases,
research reactors utilize higher fuel enrichments than typical power reactors [22]. Some of the
reactors operate with HEU fuel that may be as high as 93% and are cooled by natural or forced
cooling with pulsing capability. Their challenges range from housing stockpiles of both
unirradiated and irradiated HEU materials with quantities ranging from grams (g) to metric tons
(MTU) [23] and the need to have a credible ability to secure these nuclear materials.
Aside from the earlier efforts by the US and the IAEA to assist in providing technical capabilities
to reduce enrichment levels in research reactor utilization, the importance of total elimination
became obvious after the September 2001 terrorist attacks [24], and thereafter the inquest and
increase by terrorist group seeking nuclear materials for malevolent acts. In addition to the
efforts by the RERTR program, the National Academy of Science (NAS) recently published two
reports to review the status of HEU to LEU conversion for both reactor fuel and targets: 1)
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“Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors,”1 and 2)
“Molybdenum-99 for medical imaging”2 These studies revealed that conversion of research
reactors has the potential to improve performance understanding of the operating characteristics3,
contribute to further decision-making processes on the scientific evaluation, and most
importantly, reduce proliferation risk4.

Figure 1.1. IAEA database of Research Reactors
Source: [15]

“Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors,” Committee on the Current Status
of and Progress Toward Eliminating Highly Enriched Uranium Use in Fuel for Civilian Research and Test Reactors,
National Academy of Sciences, March 2016
2
“Molybdenum-99 for Medical Imaging,” Committee on State of Molybdenum-99 Production and Utilization
and Progress Toward Eliminating Use of Highly Enriched Uranium, National Academy of Sciences, October 2016
3
“National Research Council, Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities for Converting U.S. and Russian Research
Reactors, Washington D.C: National Academies Press, 2012.
4
Schickler, R. A., W. R. Marcum, and S. R. Reese. "Comparison of HEU and LEU neutron spectra in irradiation
facilities at the Oregon State TRIGA® Reactor." Nuclear Engineering and Design 262 (2013): 340-349.
1
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1.5 Study goals and objectives
The objectives of this research are aimed at setting international standards of evaluation in
measuring security, risk and material attractiveness, and threat assessment. Presently, no existing
confirmation measurements have been conducted to evaluate or confirm the NIRR-1 source term
inventories. Hence, the operational source term of the facility will be simulated for postulated
accidental release of radionuclides from an MNSR using the NIRR-1 as a study facility. These
objectives will be achieved by performing the reactor physics analysis to evaluate the threats,
dose calculations, burnup, and power distribution for security and safeguards of materials,
including its implications for storage and transportation using SCALE and ORIGEN Monte
Carlo code.
For this research, further emphasis is placed on using the TRITON tool of the SCALE code to
understand the strength of the postulated inventory of releases and how it will affect technical
requirements for assuring that the state has not embarked on a clandestine activity, or for an
adversary to acquire nuclear materials from the facility. The result from the SCALE simulation
will also be applied to developing an acquisition pathway analysis (APA) which is a requirement
for designing a state level approach (SLA) to safeguards.
Apart from the Glaser risk metric, the capabilities, strength, and mode of operation of non-state
actors within Nigeria and the region based on the past and present activities will be used to
develop risk and material attractiveness to address the vital question of an appraised value of risk
or attractiveness of nuclear materials, specifically at less than 20% enrichment at the NIRR-1
facility.
The schematic diagram of a typical MNSR and the various parts as are shown in (Figure 1.2) 1.
Reactor vessel, 2. Reactor Base, 3. Lower Orifice, 4. Bottom Reflector, 5. Annular Reflector, 6.
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Upper Orifice, 7. Upper Shim tray, 8. Lower Grid plate, 9. Fuel Elements, 10. Upper Grid plates,
11. Tie Rods, 12. Control Rods, 13. Control Rod clad, 14. Inner Irradiation site, 15. Outer
Irradiation site, 16. Reactivity Regulator, 17. Core cover

Figure 1.2. The schematic isometric diagram of a typical MNSR
Source: [25]

1.6 Research justification and study benefits
During normal operations, radioactive fission products accumulate in the primary coolant
systems, pipes, and pumps, as well as in the contamination on exterior cladding material with
fission trace uranium. It becomes important to postulate the extent that radioactive contamination
and possible on-site exposure could potentially lead to severe deterministic effects (death) or offsite ground contamination that could affect the public and the environment. Besides this,
13

postulating accident and unexpected initiating events from inventory of source term can help
prepare for any unexpected accidents as the core of the NIRR-1 is removed and transported back
to the manufacturer in China. On the other hand, the conversion program is expected to bring
about a new safeguards challenge that this research will equally address as an important
component of international security. The IAEA safeguards program was established as part of
the international security architecture to detect the diversion of significant quantities of fissile
nuclear materials against purposeful non-peaceful usage to produce nuclear weapons and
explosives as well as radiological dispersal devices [26].
When accounting for nuclear materials, a potential weakness is inadvertent or deliberate gross
over/under estimation of nuclear materials depending on the analytical methods used. The
methodology applied for the accounting of plutonium balance and elemental source term
evaluation, as well as the risk analysis in this research, will benefit the IAEA and give credible
assurance of peaceful and protected core conversion, as well as the assurance of the ability to
adhere to nuclear safeguards, NPT and pragmatic verification of design, and nuclear materials in
Nigeria.
Equally, the completion of this research will provide answers to the following fundamental
safeguards questions to draw conclusions and accomplish the set objectives of this work:
▪

What are the additional verification challenges to be faced by the NIRR-1 facility due to
the HEU core removal and the new LEU core replacement, considering the reactor
operating data history including storage of fuel materials?

▪

What quantity of plutonium will be left at the NIRR-1 facility after the conversion and
how is such being accounted for?
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▪

What are the international and domestic safeguards protocols to be met by the NIRR-1
facility for verification and regulatory oversite?

▪

What significant changes will the conversion have on the application of safeguards and
material accounting within the facility and country at large?

▪

What are the potential proliferation risks and theft pathways in the ongoing conversion
process and the probability of detection by either the facility or IAEA in case of theft or
malicious attempt?

▪

What are the potential inventory management issues and regulatory challenges due to the
conversion?

▪

What are the new safeguards challenges based on the sensitivity and uncertainty
measurements of nuclear data for the NIRR-1 facility safeguards?

▪

What are the probable scenarios that should be used as guidelines to accomplish when
designing State Level Approach (SLA) for the HEU, as well as the candidate LEU?

▪

What are the safeguards measures in place for continuous monitoring and storage of
spent fuel?

▪

What are the safeguards methodologies in place to check undeclared irradiation or
potential intent of diversion of spent fuel elements?

▪

What are the safeguards protocols in place for the eventual repatriation of the HEU fuel
to its origin?

Nigeria is a signatory to the NPT for the universal, total, and irreversible elimination of nuclear
weapons [27]. Well-understood source term inventories can be used as a tool for assurance that
Nigeria’s nuclear program follows the international verification regime. Based on the inventory,
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any unrelated radioactivity detection can indicate that a facility is potentially involved in a
clandestine operation or activity.
The inventory result from this research is expected to provide a resource of basic information
needed for the shielding calculation for core removal, storage, and transportation. A more
detailed elemental and isotope outline that could make diversions, deviations, or accidents easily
detectable based on the inventory data will be evaluated. It also provides the IAEA and national
regulators baseline ideas of elemental expectation from facility operations when further
environmental analysis is required. In addition, the evaluation of source term from the NIRR-1
facility will reveal the composition and postulated pattern of radioactivity release under different
conditions that can help plan for the readiness and the prevention of radiological hazards as the
HEU core is removed from the reactor.
Some of the existing MNSRs operate in countries (e.g. Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan) where
ongoing conflicts or security challenges of deadly terrorist groups have become a serious global
concern. Moving forward, all countries like Nigeria operating research reactors must be able to
demonstrate that the country can provide adequate security assurance using the research reactor
as a measure of the ability to fulfill the requirements in the IAEA nuclear security series (NSS)
19 implementation guide. Furthermore, the guide stipulates security as a crucial requirement for
state level nuclear program and all Member States must ensure that nuclear and radioactive
materials are protected from people with malicious, criminal, and terrorist, as well as those with
intentions to sabotage, within the facility and during transportation [28].
Therefore, burnup simulations for both HEU and LEU will provide information on the expected
plutonium balance at different power levels to ascertain the quantity of plutonium expected from
facility operations per period. At the same time, the proposed LEU will require an increase in
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normal operating power from 30kw in HEU (UA14-A1) to 34kw in LEU (UO2, Zircalloy) to have
an equivalent flux [29]. The data from the burn-up will be used to assess the worth of the
conversion process for MNSRs based on the plutonium balance, as well as rationalize the need to
develop facility-specific risk and material attractiveness including their figure of merit (FOM)
based on a global standard, while still recognizing local, regional, and international threat
assessments of each facility devoid of general assumption. At the completion of this research, the
idea generated will be used as a training support and complement to the ongoing efforts by the
DOE and IAEA with subject matter contribution to the enrichment reduction program.

1.7 Methodology
Many computational tools have been used to simulate the likelihood of radiological release into
the reactor containment and the environment, as well as to generate data for the verification of
facility operations. But each tool presents different challenges about accuracy, and this is a
limitation for the precision of output needed for the overall objectives of the conversion program.
Evaluation of source term involves efforts in tracking several core physics parameters,
operational times, and enrichment levels.
In this research, the ORIGEN capabilities of the SCALE code suite were employed to carry out
reactor physics analysis and to generate the core inventory of source term for both the HEU and
the candidate LEU. Dose calculations, plutonium balance, burnup, and power distribution
important for safeguards were carried out using the Transport Rigor Implemented with Timedependent Operation for Neutronic depletion (TRITON) code.
Even though the engineering and design drawings of the facility were not available, an MCNP
input deck created at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) as part of the effort to convert the
NIRR-1 core from HEU to LEU was obtained through a private communication and used as a
17

guide to develop a new SCALE input used in this research. The choice of SCALE suite is based
on its ability to generate Keff more precisely and with more accuracy than [30] MCNP.
Using the MCNP input as the starting point, a computational SCALE model was initiated on
Graphically Enhanced Editing Wizard (GeeWiz) platform of the SCALE 6.1. version. This
version of SCALE was chosen for the initial code development due to the availability of the
windows user interface, its user friendliness, and its ease of navigation to new code users. The
windows interface allows a step-by-step data input in a form format that can be viewed in a 3dimesional output that helps visualize complete shape of input geometry. The input file from
GeeWiz was opened in Fulcrum, a component of SCALE 6.2.3 suite, available with a graphical
user interface (GUI) that provides a modular workspace which allows the user to drag-and-drop
files. The autocompletion feature in Fulcrum helps to determine quick visual input, though the
present version of SCALE only offers a 2-dimesional view of geometry.
The results obtained at various levels were analyzed and used to develop risk and material
attractiveness and recommendations for implementing the outcomes of the research and future
works.

18

Chapter 2
REACTOR DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE NIRR-1
2.1 Description of the Nigeria Research Reactor
The Nigeria Research Reactor NIRR-1 is operated by the Center for Energy Research and
Training (CERT), Zaria, Nigeria. The reactor is a Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
licensed to operate at 31.1KW thermal power and 1.2 x 1012 neutron flux (n/cm2/s). The reactor
is a tank-in-pool type reactor with light water as moderator and coolant, and with metallic
beryllium as a reflector. The reactor has a rated design of a maximum of 4.5 hours per day at full
power [31], although it is operated for 2.5 hours daily for 5 days per week [32].
The NIRR – 1 fuel is an HEU UA14-A1 enriched at 90% with a burnup estimate of less than 1%
of fuel after 200 days of operation, corresponding to 11 years [33]. The depletion of fuel and
control of excess reactivity for the NIRR – 1 operation is done by the addition of Beryllium shim
plates to maintain the reactivity worth (mk) at 4mk at the beginning of operation [33] [34]. The
core of the reactor is a 230 mm x 230 mm square cylinder with 347 fuel pins and three Al
dummies in the fuel lattice [35] [36]. Each fuel pin consists of 2.88g of 235U loading with 1
central control rod (CD) and made up of 266 mm long cadmium absorber, 3.9 mm in diameter,
covered with stainless steel 0.5mm thick [29]. The NIRR-1 is presently used for neutron
activation analysis (NAA), research, soil elemental analysis for agriculture, identification of solid
minerals, and training, but the conversion to LEU is expected to improve the operational
performance to production of radioisotopes for cancer treatment as well as developing
competencies towards the Nigeria nuclear power program. Nigeria has received support under
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the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) for the conversion of the NIRR-1 fuel from HEU
to LEU as well as the RERTR program.

2.2 The NIRR-1 Core Design
The NIRR-1 core is made up of a 350-lattice position space, out of which 347 are fuel elements
containing UA14-A1 enriched at 90% and covered in an aluminum cladding while the remaining
lattice positions are made of dummy aluminum elements laid out in 10 organized cylindrical
formations of varying diameter in the fuel cage and surrounded by an annular beryllium
reflector. The cage is covered by a top shim tray of beryllium as well as another beryllium
reflector below the cage. The fuel cage is held together by 2 grid plates, each placed above and
below the cage, as well as 4 number tie-rods and the guide tube that controls the control rod
movement.

2.3 Proposed LEU core design
An initial design specification for the candidate LEU core was initiated by a group of experts and
coordinated by the IAEA with a preliminary enrichment benchmarked at 12.5% by simulating
the reactor’s design parameters such that there would be approximately the same number of fuel
rods, water fissile ratios, negative reactivity, and power coefficients that will compensate for the
expected penalties of core replacement [37]. Apart from this initial specification, several other
experts have engaged the use of different computer codes to simulate the LEU core replacement.
Previous computational studies have suggested that a 19.75% UO2 [38], as well as U3Si, U3Si2,
and U9Mo [39] fuel, will be a good replacement for the present HEU core and can appropriately
match the parameters of the present HEU after the conversion. A Generic Base parameter for
both the HEU (UAl alloy) versus LEU (UO2) candidate fuel is enumerated in Appendix 1
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Nonetheless, the generic number of LEU fuel is 348, and this work utilized 347 in reference to
the SAR for NIRR-1. As well, (Table 2.1.) highlights the uranium isotopic for both the HEU
(UAl alloy) and the LEU (UO2) candidate fuel.
Due to the difference in thermal power between the HEU at 30 Kw and the LEU at 34 Kw, the
increment in the macroscopic cross section of fission is inevitable with a constant flux and core
volume to pay for the penalty of conversion depicted by Equation 2.0.

𝑃=

∅𝑡ℎ 𝛴𝑓 𝑉

equation 2.0

𝑓ⅈ𝑠𝑠ⅈ𝑜𝑛

3⋅12×1010 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑒𝑐

where,
P = Power
∅𝑡ℎ = thermal neutron flux
𝛴𝑓 = the macroscopic cross section of fission
𝑉 = the core volume

Table 2.1. Uranium isotopic for both the HEU (UAl alloy) and the LEU (UO2) candidate fuel
pins
Uranium Isotopes
235
U
238
U
234
U
236
U
Total

HEU (wt%)
90.0
9.0
1.0
0.0
100

LEU (wt%)
12.5
87.05
0.2
0.25
100
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Chapter 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Preliminary Conversion Concept
This research took advantage of several literatures, methodologies, and processes previously
established on research reactor enrichment reduction to establish the importance of further
benchmarking the codes used in simulating postulated accidents, as well as the need to update
security and safeguards requirements at these facilities in accordance with the threat level
identified from the facility assessment. A greater amount of the existing literature laid more
emphasis on safety of these reactors during conversion and the implementation of adequate
protection when HEU is converted or reduced to LEU. But, according to the IAEA, an aspect of
state’s fulfilment of international obligations is the protection of personnel and the environment
from exposure to the harmful effects of radiation including safety practices in all its
ramifications, whereas security as a state international obligation seek to prevent, detect, and
protect nuclear facilities and nuclear and radiological materials from theft, sabotage, and
unauthorized access.
Source terms and the quantity of radioactive materials expected to be released into the
environment during normal and shutdown operations on a per isotope basis is one of the most
important technical projections of the conversion program. This research was able to identify and
review challenges from previous literature about university-based research reactor conversion
programs, especially simulated events concerning γ, α, and β radiation, as well as postulated
challenges that may arise in prospective detonation of radiological dispersal devices (RDD) like
60

Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 192Ir, 238Pu, 241Am, and 252Cf produced from medical and industrial isotopes
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[40]. Any of the sources listed above may be obtained by terrorist or malicious personnel but
acknowledging the strength of damage from the sources with high activity content is important to
the facility level security awareness and planning.
New ideas were generated based on these reviews which further laid credence to the need to
consider security of nuclear materials even at enrichment below 20% that could be denoted as
LEU. In addition, a new methodology for benchmarking parameters for all levels of enrichment
reduction that looked outside safety to a more engaging security and safeguards of nuclear
materials, mostly in regions of the world where definable threats exist, that could result in
proliferation or malicious use of nuclear material was developed.
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was the first to carry out the viability of a
replacement LEU for research reactors with the conversion of the Oak Ridge Research Reactor
(ORR) in 1987 using the mixed-core approach [41]. After this, several operating research
reactors have been converted from HEU to LEU. More than a few methodologies and codes have
been used to postulate operational safety of nuclear materials for various conversion activities,
and the deployment of these codes and methodologies have also helped to identify conceptual
challenges from the obtained results necessitating further studies.
The conversion of research reactors is based on comparing the operating parameters of HEU
with a matching LEU substitute, as well as meeting all required regulatory standards including
facility specific commitment to the safety, safeguards, and security for both the unirradiated and
irradiated fuel. Equally, the projected fuel replacement must be estimated comparing the data of
both mass per element ratio and enrichment ratio. Conversion of the research reactor increases
the 238U content which is the dominant isotope in LEU, the difference in the weight fraction, as
well as the nuclear cross sections and the reactor power must be compensated for. This gap is
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referred to as the “penalty factor” and denoted as fpenalty. This factor varies in different reactors
but is generally between 1.2 – 2.0.

The ratio of mass per element is defined as:

𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑈
𝑀𝐻𝐸𝑈

……………………………………………. equation 3.0

where, 𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑈 = mass of LEU
𝑀𝐻𝐸𝑈 = mass of HEU

While the enrichment ratio is defined as:

𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑈
𝑒𝐻𝐸𝑈

………………………………………………equation 3.1

where, 𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑈 = enrichment of LEU
𝑒𝐻𝐸𝑈 = enrichment of HEU

Aside from finding a LEU replacement with matching operating parameters, information
obtained from source term provides both the regulators and operators with an estimate of
postulated radioactivity release and the capability the facility requires for accident mitigation.
Correspondingly, the knowledge aided the development of scenarios to overcome the extent of
the challenges identified based on the elements and their corresponding daughter isotopes. In
addition, it also provided the technical information required for shielding, cask design, storage,
and eventual transportation of both the unirradiated and irradiated fuel including for emergency
planning and response.
It is required that any facility undertaking a facility redesign be subject to conducting and
evaluating operational accident source term (AST) and the investigation of uncertainties in
measured and calculated quantities to determine safety margins with associated consequences for
the management of severe accidents [42]. For the NIRR-1, the result from the AST provides a
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starting point for the SAR update including the methodologies used in evaluating the technical
requirements for safety and security.
The NIRR – 1 fuel is an HEU UA14-A1 enriched at 90% with a burnup estimate of less than 1%
of fuel after 10 years. To perform a feasibility search for suitable LEU for the conversion of
NIRR-1, an MCNP model of the current HEU core was developed and benchmarked by
experimental data [43]. A uranium dioxide (UO2) LEU option with 12.5% enrichment was
initially identified as a suitable replacement for the HEU core with minor changes to the core
configuration [44]. However, the manufacturer of the reactor, China Institute of Atomic Energy
(CIAE), recommended a 13% enriched UO2 fuel rather than the initial 12.5% enrichment
projected for the conversion of all MNSRs per the collaboration between the RERTR and the
IAEA’s CRP. Results obtained from the re-evaluation suggested that a UO2 LEU fuel with 341
pins containing nine Zircalloy claddings can provide about the same cold core excess reactivity
of 4.91 mk comparable to the present HEU core at 4.97 mk. This contrasts with the 12.5%
enriched UO2 core requirement of 348 fuel pins and two Zircalloy claddings that was initially
projected. Aside from that, there is a departure in the value of simulated prompt neutron lifetime
(lf) quoted by the manufacturer using ‘EXTERMINATORS’ diffusion code to the result obtained
by Ibikunle et al (2016) when compared to calculated kinematics parameters obtained for the
present HEU and three other reference LEU alternatives [39] In another related work that was
motivated by the identified discrepancies in the enrichment proposed by the manufacturer at 13%
compared to the initial proposal of the SAR, data at 12% enrichment for the LEU replacement,
Jonah et al found out that two different options each with 12.45% and 12% [45] enrichment will
suffice for an LEU substitute.
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As well, Ibikunle et al further investigated the core physics analysis for a suitable LEU
replacement with three different dispersed LEU fuel (U3Si, U3Si2 and U9Mo) replacements at
19.75% enrichment highlighted in (Table 3.0) Ibikunle further reported a discrepancy in the
reactor in simulation and submitted that the power level of any of the three measured LEU fuels
must be increased from 31kw to 34 kw to obtain an equivalent flux compared to that of the
present HEU fuel [46].

Table 3.1. HEU versus three proposed dispersed LEU fuel parameters
Fuel type

Enrichment
%

Density of
meat/U
(g/cc)

Clad
material/
thickness
(mm)
Al/0.60

No of
fuel
pins

3.456/0.92

Fuel
meat
diameter
(mm)
4.30

HEU - UAl4

90.2

1 LEU - U3Si
2 LEU - U3Si2
3 LEU - U9Mo
Source: [46]

19.75
19.75
19.75

7.394/5.49
6.409/4.42
8.210/5.95

4.30
4.74
4.30

Al/0.60
Al/0.38
Al/0.60

347
347
347

347

The evaluation of source term in different research reactors is used in the analysis and behavioral
understanding of radionuclides’ dispersal pattern at each facility and emergency preparedness
planning. It can provide information significant to securing such materials and preventing
unauthorized access to the facility. However, the data collected from each reactor are not
identical in any two identical reactors operating with the same burnup rates.
Accordingly, data collected as source term from the analysis of core physics parameters form
part of a significant requirement for license application and provide information on the changes
to the facility including design information in fulfillment of the IAEA Comprehensive
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Safeguards Agreement (CSA). It also provides the baseline information required for the IAEA
verification. It is used as the activity reference point which assures that a facility is operating
according to design specification while also assisting the facility’s modelling of radioactive
dispersal pathways and the volatility of identified nuclides.
In previous research directed towards establishing core physics parameters of a replacement fuel
for NIRR-1, Rabba et al [33] estimated the burnup rate using the BUNRER Code VENTURE
with a UO2 LEU fuel and found out that the LEU substitute fuel has a burnup rate of about 1%
for 200 days of reactor operation at 9 hours per week. This is an equivalent usage of 0.49 Kg of
238

U. However, only the plutonium isotope (239Pu, 240Pu and 241Pu) generated in the core of

NIRR-1 were recorded by the code [33]. On the contrary, the need for security and safeguards
warrants that all radioactive content expected to be released in form of source term from the core
of the reactor into the pipes, coolant water, and the environment are significantly important.
Additionally, the work did not establish or evaluate the source strength, or the physical
characteristics of radioactive materials in terms of half-life and its deposition velocity [47] from
the generated source term.
Generally, irradiation and fuel burnup lead to fissile nuclide consumption by fission which
results in the formation of fission products directly or by radioactive decay. However, some of
these fission products have their significant merits and demerits in terms of health and safety
of personnel, the public, and the environment due to the range of their half-lives. In operational
planning, the protection of health and safety of personnel and of the public from radiological and
non-radiological hazards associated with radioactivity [48] is important in practices and services
associated with reactor technology. Hence, the knowledge of their decay period and the ability to
be able to control the spread of the hazards it may present to personnel, the environment, and to
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the larger population during accident situations is worth devoting attention to evaluate their
release using appropriate depletion code.
The NRC enumerated the expected release fraction using the ORIGEN isotope and depletion
code for all low burnup and low enrichment as highlighted in (Table 3.2) [42], and the resultant
IAEA assessment accordingly in (Table 3.3) [49]. In this work, the evaluation was carried out
using ORIGEN isotope generation and depletion computer code from the most recent update of
SCALE 6.2.3. to generate the NIRR-1 core inventory and the postulated source term from the
HEU and LEU core.

Table 3.2. Source term grouping and their expected release fractions (US NRC)
Groups
Expected
release
fraction

Noble
Gases
1.0

Halogens
0.4

Alkali
Metals
0.3

Tellurium
0.05

Ba-Sr
group
0.02

Noble
metal
0.0025

Cerium
group
0.0005

Lanthanide
0.0002

Source: USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.183

Table 3.3 Source term grouping and their expected release fractions (IAEA))
Groups
Expected release
fraction

Noble Gases (%)

Halogens (%)

100

50

Particulates
(%)
1

Source: IAEA-TECDOC-643
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The result from several conversion efforts enumerated below showed diverse challenges
assumed to have been caused by the transfer of data between codes and the RUN time of the
codes.

3.1.1 Pakistan Research Reactor-1
Shoaib et al [50] modelled the atmospheric dispersion and estimated accidental airborne
radionuclide release from the Pakistan Research Reactor-1 (PARR-1) for the power upgrade of
the PARR – 1 to a 10 MW based on the US Nuclear Regulatory Authority guide 1.183 to
determine the atmospheric dispersion and the source term for the fission product inventory in the
reactor core for the PARR-1, and to plan for evacuation during an emergency [50]. The
importance of Shoaib’s work was seen in the discovery that the dose rate obtained from his work
was more than the permissible committed effective dose (CED) at 500 m from the downwind
distance away from the reactor, according to the scenario result obtained from the released
fraction calculation for PARR-1. The result further laid credence to the importance of estimating
facility-specific source term of radioactive accidental release from the core of any reactor during
operations as a requirement for license renewal for any facility modification.

3.1.2 Syria Research Reactor
Dawahra et al [51] used the GETERA code to calculate fuel burn up and radionuclide inventory
for the 30 KW Syria Research reactor (SRR-1) including the output of activities of fission
products and actinides after 200 days of burn up time. In his result, the atomic density of LEU
was found to have decreased compared to that of the HEU for the same number of burn up times,
hence the need for a higher density LEU fuel material. However, the result obtained by Dawahra
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showed that the conversion of the SRR-1 from HEU to LEU presents some overall advantage in
terms of cost [51], and further verified the reactors operational safety and site-specific security.
Accordingly, Dawahra also estimated postulated radiological hazards associated with the
operation of SRR-1 and the concentrations of fission products and actinide radionuclides in the
core by investigating the source term due to all operations within the facility. The result obtained
clearly outlined the importance of source term. Consequently, the outcome of the SRR-1 core
inventory for both the HEU and the LEU fuel became an important consideration for modelling
spent fuel management scenarios [52] for safe operations. This inventory is significant because
the NIRR-1 core will be removed as irradiated spent fuel, thus the need to postulate different
scenarios of events that may be dangerous to the personnel and the public due to an unexpected
radionuclide release.

3.1.3 Ghana Research Reactor (GHARR-1)
The GHARR-1 is a tank in pool reactor that utilizes HEU as fuel. The GHARR-1 has 344 fuel
elements dispersed in 27.5% aluminum in U-Al matrix with enrichment of 90.2%. The reactor
was designed with a 10-year HEU core and it was operated at its maximum core flux for 2.5
hours in a day for 5 days in a week. The GHARR-1 is one of the research reactors recently
converted from HEU to LEU. Neutronic analysis based on MCNP transport was carried out for
both the candidate LEU and the operating HEU based on the scheduled core conversion
program. Equally, a comparative core performance assessment was carried out for both fuels. As
part of the conversion efforts, Abrefah et al used ORIGEN2 and REBUS3 codes to estimate the
end-of-cycle isotopic inventory for the design of the spent fuel cask [53] [54] for the
transportation and HEU core repatriation back to the manufacturers in China. Abrefah asserted
that the result obtained was consistent with literature for the HEU core when similar calculations
30

were carried out using different methods. The GHARR-1 initial safety analysis report (SAR) also
projected a UO2 enriched at 12.5% and confirmed by the IAEA’s CRP project on MNSR
conversion. A further work by Odoi et al also confirmed that the rated power of the LEU core
must be increase from 31KW to 34KW as well as increase the fuel pins from 344 in HEU to 348
to retain the core excess reactivity at 4.0mk including the flux at 1.0 x 1012n.cm2.s [54] [55].
However, there were slight discrepancies between the manufacturer’s calculated parameters as
compared to the postulations from other simulated reactor core physics. According to the CIAE,
the manufacturer of the MNSR prototype, a UO2 LEU core enriched at 13% was simulated to be
the replacement fuel for the core of the NIRR-1 MNSR reactor.
Eventually, the GHARR-1 was shut down for core cooling in 2016, and finally, removed and
repatriated back to China. The present LEU core for GHARR-1 now consists of a zircaloy-4
alloy of UO2 fuel elements enriched at 13% based on the manufacturer’s recommendation, at a
total cost of about 20 million USD [54]. The LEU core is expected to operate for about 25 years.
(Figure 3.1 and 3.2) shows the vertical cross section of GHARR-1 core and the of cask
containing the GHARR-1 HEU core
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Figure 3.1. Vertical cross section of GHARR – 1 HEU core
Source: Abrefah et al

Figure 3.2. Gamma dose rate monitor of cask containing the GHARR-1 HEU core
Source: iaea.org
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3.1.4 The Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA)
The KUCA has a unique feature due to the combination of different core types and neutron
sources. The KUCA is a multi-core type thermal spectrum critical assembly devoted to
fundamental research and education on reactor physics. KUCA consists of two solid moderated
(dry) cores and one light water moderated (wet) core loaded with HEU fuels. In 2012, the DOE
and the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) conducted joint scientific research for the
substitution of the HEU fuel to a LEU based fuel, the outcome of which presented some
drawbacks in core performance safety and validity of academic research results of the LEU fuel
candidate. U-MO fuel was selected for consideration with varying thicknesses to match up the
performance of the HEU fuel. But from the result of safety analysis obtained, the scientific
understanding, including the performance of fuel used in the conversion at the KUCA facility
was inadequate [56]. The initial studies done on the conversion indicated that a U10Mo with foil
thickness of 12 mils was inadequate due to the technical challenges of the high accuracy demand
in fabricating the foil thickness of the replacement LEU fuel which offered a total dependence of
core reactivity on the fabrication tolerance. This type of technical challenge is not typical and has
not been witnessed in any previous conversion. As such, an alternative fuel U7Mo with 19.75%
enrichment in a mixture of aluminum matrix density 6gU/cc was proposed by a joint research
between the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute (KURRI) in Japan and the Argonne
National Laboratory (ANL) in the US under the auspices of US DOE Material Management and
Minimization (M3) program [57]. The collaboration will afford further US-Japan strategic
promotion of a much-needed opportunity to share technical experience, as was announced jointly
by both countries during the 2014 nuclear security summit as part of the US-Japan Nuclear
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Security Working Group (NSWG) [58], to be part of the continuous effort to resolve the
technical challenges encountered in down-blending the HEU fuel to a lower enrichment.

3.2 Stages and Timeline for HEU to LEU conversion
According to the National Academy of Science, the conversion of HEU to LEU follows some
predetermined technical and non-technical steps [59]. The technical steps may be related in all
facilities in terms of the benchmarking of codes and the involvement of multiple international
organizations. However, the nontechnical steps may be different for each facility and/or country
owing to variance in policy and international relations. Because understanding the cultural
influence on the application of best practices, building of nuclear security culture, cultivating
safeguards culture, and the implementation process of a nuclear infrastructure is crucial [1] and
country specific, the implementation structures and stages may not be the same, but the goal
remains enrichment reduction targeted towards global security.
The technical steps depicted in (Figure 3.2) and bounded by thick lines consists of stages in the
conversion program that require or are subject to constraint in fuel performance and the general
geometry of the new core design while the nontechnical, represented in dotted lines, are stages in
the conversion program that are related to funding, economics, and general policy within the
facility or country.
Although the National Academy of Science steps in (Figure 3.2) take care of the safety
parameters and most of the technical requirements for the conversion, most of the MNSRs
considered for conversion are in areas presently known to be volatile and prone to terrorist
attacks. Then, security becomes an issue of utmost consideration in operation, storage, and
transport. As well, it is significant to carry out threat assessment and to note the inherent risk at
enrichment below 20%, including the attractiveness in storage and transport. As such, this
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research recognizes the importance of security culture in the application and implementation of
policies that support technical innovations that vary from country to country. Importantly, the
fuel of NIRR-1 will be shipped back to the country of origin (China), adequate security and
transport security plans must be recognized for licensing purposes and be put in place. Hence the
addition of the two more stages to the recommendation of the Material Management and
Minimization (M3) program colored in green in (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3. Stages of HEU to LEU conversion including timeline
Source: Adapted from the National Academies
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Chapter 4
THE REACTOR PHYSICS MODELING APPROACH
4.1 Reactor Physics Modelling
This chapter details the procedures for the simulation of the NIRR-1 core and the general
modelling of the hypothetical MNSR reactor representation used in this work. It also highlights
the modeling approach and the methodologies adapted for the analyses of lattice and reactor core
physics, HEU and LEU fuel assessments, radionuclide nuclide inventories, and the associated
operational source term. It must be pointed out that for converting or lowering enrichment in any
reactor, there must be adequate adjustment to the technical specifications of the original core,
most especially for the excess core reactivity and the shutdown margins, as well as the
identification any operation constraint [60].
Though engineering and design drawings were not available at the commencement of this work,
an existing MCNP input was used as a guide. The choice of SCALE package was because of its
capability to generate Keff more precisely and with more accuracy [30] than MCNP, as well as its
all-inclusive capabilities for depletion and activation, and for the advantage of having an updated
library that contain up to about 2200 nuclides including about 1470 pre-generated burnup
libraries. However, starting with a lower version of SCALE, the Graphically Enhanced Editing
Wizard (GeeWiz) is shown in (Figure 4.1) due to its user friendliness in executing, plotting, and
viewing results in 3-D [61], the composition and geometry of the reactor were initiated.
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Figure 4.1. SCALE 6.1 GeeWiz toolbars

4.2 Code description
A wide range of physical parameters were considered to correctly represent reactor physics
parameters to simulate the characteristics of the HEU, as well as the equivalent parameter of the
candidate LEU fuel, taking into cognizance safety restrictions that must compensate for the
penalties of converting from a higher to a lower enrichment. The core of the NIRR-1 reactor is
comprised of 350 units of lattice rod position out of which 347 contain the fuel elements and
three dummy rod positions. For the existing HEU, the fuel elements are made up of 90%
enriched uranium-aluminum alloy, ordered in layers of ten multi-concentric circles at a pitch
distance of 10.95 mm operating at 31 KW (th). At the same time, the candidate LEU fuel
projected for the conversion program was designed such that it retained the same size and shape
of the outbound HEU core. However, the LEU fuel element is made up of 12.5wt % uranium-
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oxide pellets with zircaloy-4 clad with simulated and expected operating power of 34 KW (th).
Both, the HEU and LEU core simulated design, are located inside an annular beryllium reflector,
resting over another lower beryllium reflector plate. The fuel pins are held together by a
combination of two grid plates, guide tube, and four tie rods located in opposite ends of the pin
bundle [32]
The code input was initiated, as mentioned above, by entering parameters into the GeeWiz
platform using the composition window shown in (Figure 4.2). Equally, the geometry for the fuel
lattice structure of the reactor core was manually generated into the user-friendly windows
shown in (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.2. SCALE 6.1 GeeWiz composition window for NIRR-1 model
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Figure 4.3. Developing the geometry for fuel lattice

Additionally, the windows interface in GeeWiz allows a step-by-step data input menu in a form
format that can be viewed in a 3-dimesional output; this is another advantage the GeeWiz hold
over the more recent SCALE 6.2.3 version. Additional adjustments were made on fulcrum, the
platform that serves as the graphic user interface (GUI). The KENO3D function helps to
intermittently visualize complete shape of input geometry [62] as the model progresses in a way
that ensures that the output is exactly what is being anticipated as shown in (Figure 4.4). One of
the aims of this research is to be able to use the outcome as a training model to support the
ongoing efforts of the DOE and the IAEA with subject matter contribution to the enrichment
reduction program.
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Figure 4.4. SCALE 3-D model view of NIRR-1 core inside Beryllium reflector

The initiated lattice physics model on GeeWiz was opened in fulcrum, a component of SCALE
6.2 suite available with a graphical user interface (GUI) that provides a modular workspace.
Fulcrum allows a user to drag and drop generated files for analysis. Despite the user friendliness
using the window menu format for input in GeeWiz, the SCALE 6.2 version is an improvement
over the 6.1 version because of the enhanced capability in the analysis of continuous energy (CE)
Monte Carlo, radiation shielding, depletion, and the fulcrum window, as well as the ENDF/BVII.1 nuclear data libraries inclusion of an improved group structure.
The autocompletion feature in fulcrum helps to determine quick visual input for creating, editing,
validating, and visualizing inputs. Though this version is a newer model, it only offers a 2dimesional view of geometry that includes a user interface that automatically connects with other
SCALE embedded resource.
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Presently embedded in all the versions of SCALE suite code are several built-in geometry
designs for various reactor cores; LWR, BWR, etc., as seen in (Figure 4.5), which can be
generated automatically as an array when dimensions are specified as input to the code.
However, going by this, the design pattern of the NIRR1 core must be painstakingly entered
manually for all the 350 lattice positions.
The input data as well as the depletion model was set up on fulcrum at intervals of time
according to the operating history of NIRR-1, with respect to the decaying continuous
operational power of the reactor using the Transport Rigor Implemented with Time-dependent
Operation for Neutronic depletion (TRITON). The simulated input was depleted, using the “=t6depl” command for the Monte Carlo depletion KENO-VI.

Figure 4.5. Samples of existing fuel design with SCALE (Array types)
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4.3 Execution of Code
4.3.1 General depletion equation
The ORIGEN uses a type of depletion equation resulting from the solution to the system of
ordinary differential equation (ODE) in solving for the production and loss rate of nuclides, as
well as the effective multiplication factor known as Keff. The depletion equation measures the
rate of change in nuclide concentration.

𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑑𝑡

𝑚

=∑
𝑗=1

𝑙𝑖𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑁𝑗 + 𝛷 ∑𝑚
𝑘=1 𝑓𝑖𝑘 𝜎𝑘 𝑁𝑘 – ( 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛷 𝜎𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 ) 𝑁𝑖 𝐹𝑖

equation 4.0

If we consider the equation above as A = B + C – D
where,
A represents; Rate of change in Nuclide i
B represents; Decay into Nuclide i in order j
C represents; Production of Nuclide i from irradiation and
D represents; Loss of Nuclide i through decay, irradiation, or other means

Considering the transmutation equation above in matrix form
Ṅ(𝑡) = AN(𝑡)
where,
𝑑𝑁
Ṅ=
𝑑𝑡

equation 4.1

Nonetheless, the nuclide vector solution can be written in the form;
N(𝑡) = exp (𝐴𝑡) N(𝑂)
equation
4.2
where,
N(𝑂) = Vector of initial atom densities
A = N x N transition matrix containing rate coefficients for radioactive decay, neutron
capture and fission
A matrix of transition elements (S-1) will look like;
A=-𝜆

– 𝛷𝜎

equation 4.3
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The exponential matrix solution above can also be expressed to solve the coupled differential
equations for the 2600 nuclides in as fast as 0.02 seconds when the initial nuclide concentrations,
neutron flux (derived from power), nuclear decay data, and neutron cross sections are known. It
must be recognized that the accuracy of nuclear data determines how best the ORIGEN output
will become.
The code was executed on the Nuclear Engineering Cluster, “NeCluster”. The Necluster is a
combination of 60 computational nodes tightly synchronized and linked together like a single
computer. The outputs from the RUN are broadly analyzed and discussed in chapter 7.
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Chapter 5
GENERALIZED RISK MODEL, MATERIAL
ATTRACTIVENESS AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The elevated concern over the utilization of HEU in research reactors has prompted several
international initiatives to strengthen nuclear security and nonproliferation. Prominent among the
strategies adopted is reducing enrichment and stockpiling of weapon-usable materials globally. It
is assumed that reducing inventory of such materials is a prerequisite to risk reduction, especially
after the September 2011 terrorist attack in the US. Aside this, there are several indications that
the level of security at research reactor facilities may not be as robust as that which is obtainable
at power reactor facilities [63].
The recognized challenges further raised the probability of preeminent risk in the continuous
utilization of weapon-usable materials in research reactors. Nonetheless, it is also envisaged that
lowering the enrichment in such reactors increases the attractiveness in terms insider ability to
initiate material theft or sabotage. Even though the emission of dangerous gamma rays from
research reactor spent fuel makes it self-protecting, nuclear material becomes a source for
proliferation concern as the radioactive fission products in this spent fuel reduces due to its decay
over a period [63]. Essentially, the longer the decay period, the lesser the risk of acquisition by
an adversary and the higher the attractiveness and material vulnerabilities that could be attributed
to such material for malicious or non-peaceful applications.
In the past, risk communication methodologies heavily relied on categorization of the safe level
of enrichment in research reactors using individual preferences and personal perception
representations rather than situational and evidence based. According to the US homeland
security, the first significant step to understanding risk is to be acquainted to the risk
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environment, in addition to considering the policy and political climate [64] associated with the
subject matter to be investigated, including vulnerabilities and the corresponding consequences
which the occurrence may impose on a facility, country, or the international community [65]
rather than using a single technical or safety occurrence. Identification of threats and
vulnerabilities, followed by the analysis of risk to be posed by the identified vulnerabilities and
their individual contribution to the challenges, is the first step to safeguards and security of
nuclear materials. Equally, there must be policy guidelines with adequate regulatory framework
to sustain the application of safeguards and security.

5.1 Risk and material attractiveness in research reactors
Apparently, the use of both the HEU and LEU in research reactors raises obvious proliferation
risk of theft and nuclear material misapplication. HEU, on one hand, is a direct weapon-usable
material while the LEU precipitates higher plutonium yield because of its neutron capture in
uranium-238 [66] as the operating thermal power of the reactor increases.
The variation due to enrichment reduction was measured in the Ghana Research Reactor
(GHARR-1), and it was found that the conversion of HEU to LEU will require increasing the
fuel pins from 344 to 348 to arrive at the same reactivity as the outgoing HEU. Additionally, the
reactor nominal power must be increased from 31 kW to 34kW to retain the neutron flux at 1 ×
1012 n.cm2.s inside the irradiation sites [67]. Doing this will compensate for the conversion
penalties and safety margins required to retain the same operating parameters equivalent to the
outgoing HEU.
According to the IAEA, risk of nuclear materials acquisition to manufacture NED, risk of
acquisition of nuclear materials to produce a radiological dispersal devices (RDD), and total
facility sabotage are the three main types of risk that must be considered when planning to secure
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nuclear materials [68]. Besides this, it is important that all security risk analysis and calculation
be consistent with associated vulnerability, threat assessment, environmental factors, and the
state regulations. Notably, the combined knowledge of threat motives of non-state actors and the
increasing threat itself can help provide effective and strategic national and foreign security
policy [69].
Consequently, a wide range of initiating events leading to a step-by-step approach to securing
nuclear materials at these facilities must be considered from factors that could lead to or
contribute to nuclear terrorism, material attractiveness, as well as their corresponding figure of
merit (FOM) and the likelihood of an insider or any non-state actor with global reach acquiring
nuclear materials from any facility directly or by proxy to make dirty bombs or RDDs. With the
knowledge of factors known, the development of facility physical security from the evaluation of
possible pathways for material acquisition must also be considered.

5.2 The Glaser “Risk Metric”
The Glaser Metric concept was described in chapter one and it postulated that the reduction of
enrichment from 93% to 45% cuts the attractiveness to about 40%, while the reduction from 93%
to 20% cuts the attractiveness by about 70%. Glaser evaluated risk to the use of HEU and the
justification for the conversion of fuel in research and test reactors to LEU based on the
methodology of strategic value (SV) to quantify material attractiveness and risk value of uranium
and plutonium in two scenarios. His assumption relied on an adversary having either basic or
advanced capabilities as enumerated in equation 5.1 and 5.2 with fuel burnup rate at 40% to
arrive at a risk metric for an MTR type reactor geometry operated at 30MW and varied at
different enrichments and periods of operation to arrive at the 70% percentage attractiveness
reduction “making inevitable ad-hoc assumptions” [12]. Acknowledging the model with the
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assertion of the increase challenges to be faced by adversaries to manufacture weapon-useable
materials as the enrichment decreases from higher to lower percentages.
Glaser used equation 5.1 quantitatively to derive the capability of an adversary’s skill to produce
a gun type weapon with a direct use of uranium recovered from spent fuel using mathematically
derived equation 5.1 to arrive at SV. Which technically depends on the ability of an adversary’s
ability to reprocess and recover the much-needed material from a spent fuel.

𝐶𝑀𝐴∗ = 𝜂1 (𝜖𝐹𝐹 )

𝑚𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝐵 (∈𝐹𝐹 )

+ 𝜂1 (𝜖𝑆𝐹 )

𝑚𝑆𝐹
𝑀𝐵 (𝜖𝑆𝐹 )

equation 5.1

where,
𝐶𝑀𝐴∗ = Total strategic value of material
𝑀𝐵 = One bare critical mass of uranium
𝜂1 = Weighting factor
𝐹𝐹 and 𝑆𝐹 = mass
𝜖 = Enrichment level

While in equation 5.2 quantitatively measured the scenario where the extent of an adversary
capability can manufacture an implosion type weapon from the combined worth of uranium and
plutonium of critical mass 4 kg in equation 5.2

𝑚𝐹𝐹
𝑅 (𝜖𝐹𝐹 )

𝐶𝑀𝐵∗1 = 𝜂2 (𝜖𝐹𝐹 ) 𝑀

𝑚𝑆𝐹
𝑅 (𝜖𝑆𝐹 )

+ 𝜂2 (𝜖𝑆𝐹 ) 𝑀

𝑚𝑝

𝑢
+ 4.0𝑘𝑔

equation 5.2

Glaser performed his calculation using MCNP and his work relied on a result from a single
rod/unit cell calculation rather than the whole core of the reactor MTR. His work emphasized
proliferation concern and attributes measured based on (i) intermittent refueling of research
reactors over the life time of the facility, (ii) fresh fuel shipment and (iii) the storage of same
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within the facility. However, combined attributes for the global enrichment reduction conversion
of reactors utilizing HEU to LEU was based on the concern for security, vulnerability of
materials, perceived misuse and the acquisition of the materials by terrorist group. If all these
factors were realistically considered, material attractiveness and risk evaluation must therefore
consider all environmental factors, vulnerability assessments, adversary type and capabilities
peculiar to each of the facilities since they are operated under different conditions but the same
and domesticated international standards.
Based on this study, it is worthy to note that most MNSR facilities, no refueling or fuel storage is
particularly necessary because the reactor is built to operate for about ten (10) years made
possible with the addition of beryllium plates as the fuel is consumed.
Again, the Glaser risk metrics identified strategic value for material attractiveness at different
level of enrichment above and below 20% including the results obtainable from the two
scenarios in equation 5.1 and 5.2. Nonetheless, assuming reducing enrichment from 93% to 20%
reduces attractiveness by 70%. Even so, there is no perfect system, the state and the rest of the
international community retains the liability of the remaining 30% attractiveness to nuclear
materials. Hence, 30% risk is not best practice and cannot translate to an acceptable risk for
licensing and regulatory requirements in safety, security and safeguards.
The theft of irradiated materials from the NIRR-1 facility may not be viable because of the selfprotecting nature of irradiated materials from the reactor which is ascribed as a form of physical
protection at nuclear facilities. However, terrorist groups may be willing to sacrifice self against
the recommended limit of 1 Sv/hr standard of unshielded material at 1 meter [70] to obtain or
expose irradiated material to the facility and cause environmental hazard. The core of NIRR-1 is
designed and subject to removal and shipment to the manufacturer at the end of its useful core
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life which should have eliminated the perpetual storage of fresh fuel, on the contrary, 3 pins of
fresh unirradiated HEU fuel is kept within the facility storage room. Intrinsically, our risk
emphasis is placed on the risk of invasion or disruption by insider or any of the nonstate actors as
well as the theft of one or more of the unirradiated fuel in storage.
Globally, non-state actors are recognized as an out-of-bound to all known security and the
nonproliferation strategies, and according to the International Security Index (iSi), it is expected
that the strength and the scale of their activities including the threat of nuclear war between
countries [71] will generally be on the increase. In the light of these threats, securing nuclear
materials becomes very imperative that the methodologies for estimating risk and materials
attractiveness should neither be limited to technical inferences of enrichment reduction in the use
of nuclear materials or a parallel assertion that does not consider the threats, vulnerability(s) and
challenges peculiar to each country and facility as suggested by the Glaser risk metric.
Again, this rise will eventually at some point increase the attractiveness of nuclear materials
above the 30% denoted by the Glaser estimates. As well, methodologies for risk allocation must
consider the vulnerability, intensity, scale and consequences arising from acts of sabotage or
terrorism.
The risk model in this research was carried out and compared with one of the prominent risk
models used by the proponents of enrichment reduction in test and research reactors developed
by Glaser. In addition, the evaluation of risk and material attractiveness in this work considered
that any quantity or enrichment can be used for RDD. Therefore, information based on the type
of element, isotope, quantity and irradiation were considered to plan for mitigation of any fallout
from possible acquisition or attack at an imaginary facility designed in this research. Also, the
type (i.e, plutonium, or uranium) including their fissile content, chemical and physical form,
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extent of dilution, level of material irradiation and quantity [68] as described in Appendix 2
(table of nuclear materials at different categories) were used as guide for the analysis carried out
on the imaginary facility that represented the NIRR-1 facility.

5.3 Core physics parameters for risk evaluation
It should be pointed out that this research partially agreed with the Glaser Metric, the risk model
for this work aggregated the physics parameters in terms of the core source terms, plutonium
balance and burnup with their associated vulnerabilities to demonstrate how well the risk
evaluation is important to security and safeguards as well as the assurance that the tampering or
outright forceful removal of one or more of 345 fuel pins can be detected at all levels of
enrichment as well as the level of physical security to protect the HEU replacement fuel in
storage.
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), risk is “the potential for an
unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event as determined by its likelihood and the
associated consequences” [72]. Based on this definition, the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a
nuclear facility has been postulated by many research [73] [74] [75].

5.4 Coefficient for calculating realistic risk and risk reduction for the NIRR-1
MNSR
A well-designed facility Physical protection System (PPS) must always be tested and reviewed
and should be accurate initialize the response in action to interrupt any adversary action before
the adversary task time. Using the security risk assessment process in (Figure 5.1) was used to
evaluate the material attractiveness and the vulnerabilities of a hypothetical NIRR-1 facility.
Measures of religious ideology, poverty and corruption were also considered for the Nigerian
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situation as a measure of the risk assessment in this work. The physical protection system of this
hypothetical facility will be evaluated by an adversary sequence diagram (ASD) that will be
discussed later in this chapter. The global enrichment reduction program must conceptualize the
cost benefit analysis in the in terms of increasing the physical security of some of the facilities
where the threat and target of the adversary may not be theft but disruption.

Figure 5.1. Security Risk Assessment Process
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5.4.1 Material attractiveness by means of figure of merit (FOM)
Material attractiveness is the methodology used for the assessment of physical protection and
international safeguards. It calculates the attractiveness and evaluates the usability of plutonium
producing materials from fuel cycle [76] as well the amount or extent of material attractiveness
that could advertently be required by a proliferant state or a non-state actor for non-peaceful
purposes of weapon manufacture or production of RDDs. Material attractiveness is a guaranteed
way to evaluate the risk posed range of nuclear materials; special nuclear materials (SNM),
alternate nuclear material (ANM) and actinides with critical mass of fission products because it
uses unique physical properties of such materials for assessment in a way that they are traceable
and can be reproduced [77].
The extent of attractiveness derived as FOM defines the limits of usability of such materials
while access and the sophistication of adversary determines the type of material sorted after. The
value of usability of nuclear material can be derived from equation 5.3 when all conditions are
met.

𝐹𝑂𝑀1 = 1 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔10

𝑀
800

𝑀ℎ

𝑀

𝐷

+ 4500 + 50 (500)

1
𝑙𝑜𝑔10 2

equation 5.3

where,
M = bare critical mass of the metal (kg)
h = heat content (W/kg)
N = mass of a fuel assembly, fuel rods, or other sources of nuclear material (kg)
D = dose rate (of 0.2M or of N) evaluated at 1 meter from the surface (rad/h)
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Equally, the result following equation 5.3 is used to categorize attractiveness for materials in
form of alloys and metals as enumerated in (Table 5.1). Correspondingly, materials with FOM
between one (1) and two (2) are said to be attractive, though it is more preferred when greater
than two (2). But when the number reduces from one (1) to less than one (1), the materials
becomes less attractive and non-weapon-usable. Nevertheless, such materials could
advertently be used as RDDs when it is acquired by an adversary or any of the nonstate actors.

Table 5.1. Categorization of material attractiveness for alloys and metals based on FOM
FOM
>2
1 to 2
0 to 1
<0

Weapons Utility
Preferred
Attractive
Unattractive
Unattractive

Attractiveness
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

Source: [77]

5.4.2 Assessment of NIRR-1 facility location and vulnerabilities
Few non-state actors have been identified as having the capability to acquire weapon-usable
materials to manufacture weapon of mass destruction, though in concept, it is difficult to assert
the degree of their capabilities. It has further been suggested that the likelihood of a crude and
low-level attack technique may be employed in trying to obtain these materials with an attendant
disruptive rather than destructive [78] consequence.
It should also be pointed out that the NIRR -1 facility is in the volatile North-Eastern part of
Nigeria, where the Boko Haram terrorist group (now Islamic State of West Africa, ISWA)
operates. It is well known that this group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State terrorist group
(ISIS) and have increased their attacks on soft and vulnerable targets [79]. The Islamic State
(ISIS) is one of the known terrorist organization seeking to obtain nuclear materials from Russia
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in exchange for access to oil fields captured in the Anbar province of Iraq [80]. In 2015, it was
speculated from a recovered video evidence that the ISIS group was plotting to acquire nuclear
materials by kidnaping a senior researcher from the BR-2 reactor at the Belgian Nuclear
Research Centre or his family member as ransom to have access to the material [81]. Based on
the nearness of the Nigerian research reactor facility, it is believed that the conversion of HEU to
LEU core will be a good value added to the global risk and proliferation reduction. Besides Boko
Haram’s connection and declaration for ISIS, there are confirmed reports of a connection, offer
of assistance and training support for Boko Haram by one faction of the al-Qaida terrorist group,
al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) [82]
Other prominent non-state actors in this category interested in accessing nuclear materials to
manufacture weapon of mass destruction are the Al Qaeda, Chechnya-based separatists, Lashkare-Taiba, and Aum Shinrikyo [83]. Nonetheless, the Aum Shinrikyo based in Japan have more
than the other groups displayed intents and their capabilities for complex engineering efforts
including overwhelming penchant to facilitate and deploy chemical weapons [84]. The NIRR-1
facility’s vulnerability is not limited to terrorist attach scenario alone, the dwindling economic
situation in Nigeria makes the facility and personnel vulnerable to elicitation from outsiders.
Recalling that in 1992, 1.5 kg of HEU was stolen from a scientific facility by personnel at the
Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, due to worsening economic situation.
Similarly, a plot by some personnel of the Chelyabinsk region’s nuclear facilities was thwarted
by the Russian Federal Security Service [85].
The NIRR-1 facility is rated according to the IAEA INFCIRC 225, Rev 5 as a category III [68]
facility represented in (Table 5.2) this is based on the acknowledgement of the facility not having
significant off-site risk but with the potential for accidents resulting in deterministic health
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effects on-site. Equally, (Table 5.3) enumerated level of materials, diversion that will be enough
to develop NED as well as the IAEA categorization of nuclear materials based on INFCIRC 225,
Rev 5 [86]. Based on these tables, no amount of materials acquired under Category III is enough
to construct a nuclear explosive device. However, the risk inherent for Category III materials are
that of theft for the purpose manufacture of RDD or the environmental consequence of attack on
the facility that may inadvertently lead to death, injury and prolonged economic problem.

Table 5.2. Nuclear material categorization
Material
1.Plutonium
2.Uranium235 (235U)

3.Uranium233 (233U)

Enrichment
Any
≥20% 235U
≥10% and <20%
235
U
≥0.71% and <10%
235
U
Any

Category I
≥2 kg
≥5 kg

Category II
≥500 g and <2 kg
≥1 kg and < 5 kg

Category III

≥10 kg

≥1 kg and < 10 kg

≥15 g and < 1 kg

≥10 kg
≥2 kg

≥500 g and < 2 kg

≥15 g and < 500 g

Source: [86]

Table 5.3. Material requirements versus security categories
Security Category
Category I
Category II
Category III
Less than Category III

Thefts/Diversion
Single theft/diversion of nuclear materials enough
to build NED
At least two thefts/diversions of nuclear materials
required to build NED
Many thefts/diversions of nuclear materials
required to build NED
Thefts/diversions of nuclear materials is
insignificantly suitable to build NED

Source: [86]
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5.4.3 Religious Ideology, Poverty and corruption as a measure of security risk
Regrettably, personnel working in the over 40 of the HEU operated research reactors may be
susceptible to crime, corruption, financial inducement or blackmail in exchange for information
and nuclear material or both. Most are especially in developing countries and areas where there
is ongoing crisis. The NIRR-1 facility in Nigeria is government owned and operated and could
be vulnerable to these challenges. According to a United Nations Office on Drug and Crime
(UNODC) report on a nationwide household survey on corruption across all the states in Nigeria
conducted in 2017, it was reported that 32.3% of the sample population in Nigeria paid or
requested to pay bribes when in contact with public officials in Nigeria. It was further established
in the same survey that corrupt practices are more prevalent with younger demography while an
estimated 400 Billion NGN ($1.11 Billion) is paid yearly in cash bribes in Nigeria [87].
Essentially, the NIRR-1 facility is based in the Northern Nigeria with locally recruited personnel
with different level of education, income and the challenges that come with economic situation
in Nigeria.
With the account that Boko Haram fraternizes with other deadly terrorist groups, it is obligatory
that Nigeria and all IAEA Member States put in place good policy and adequate technical
safeguards and security protocols that is enough to meet the status of their nuclear program to
protect nuclear materials from misuse and clandestine activities [88]. A basic challenge that
could hamper governments initiative is the decline in public trust for government agenda and
policy.
There will be no international terror organization without the involvement of locals. The measure
of success in our counterterrorism activities should go beyond the understanding, planning to foil
attacks, arresting and prosecuting terrorist to examining the conditions under which and why
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each of the groups thrive in recruiting members. In a joint research by the US and some Yemeni
experts, it was discovered that poverty, low quality life and education are major drivers of locals
joining or collaborating with terrorist organizations. Even though there are little empirical
evidence to draw conclusion that poverty drives terrorism in some of these states where
increasing number of such activities have been recorded, because of reported cases among
wealthy communities [89]. Indications are that the attacks in poorest areas are becoming deadlier
as shown in (Figure 5.2), the attack heat map generated by the National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism [90]. In Nigeria, the inhabitants of the Northeastern part
where the deadly Boko Haram extremist groups operates are among the poorest. A 2012
statistics on poverty profile in Nigeria showed that out of the estimated 163 million country
population, 112.47 million representing 69% of the population are poor with the Northeast share
of about 69% of the total estimated poor [91]. Based on the heat map of attacks, the cost
conversion allocated to the conversion program must equally consider the physical facility
upgrade of the facility.
Nonetheless, to complete the evaluation of security risk and the requisite vulnerability
assessment of the NIRR-1 facility based on location, past incidences ascribed to restive and
terrorist groups, this research assumed that enrichment reduction may sound as reduced risk from
perspective of a nonprofessional or a non-scientist. To develop security policy, a better
understanding of each groups’ determination and capabilities in carrying out attacks as well as
projected targets [92]. The data on (Table 5.4) was developed based on assumption using
statistics from literature and information from well-established sources [90] on a format adapted
from “Security IndexTM, Capabilities Rating”
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Figure 5.2. Heat map of global terrorist attacks
Source: [90]
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Financial Resources and Support

IT and Communications Capability

Propaganda and Information Operations

Weapons and Munitions and Supply Lines

Logistical support and Infrastructure

Tactical Execution Experience

Operational Planning Experience

Command, Control and Target

Intelligence Collection and Targeting

Personnel

Table 5.4. Threat capability and evaluation of non-state actors in Nigeria and affiliates

Boko Haram
4
4
5
3
4
4
5
5
4
5
Islamic Movement in Nigeria (INM)
2
4
4
2
2
4
3
3
2
3
Kala Kato
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
Izala Movement
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
The Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS) 4
5
4
5
4
4
5
4
4
4
Al Qaeda
4
4
3
4
3
4
5
4
3
4
Chechnya-based separatists
4
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
Lashkar-e-Taiba
4
3
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
3
Aum Shinrikyo
5
3
3
5
3
4
5
4
5
4
“Fulani Cattle rearers” (Herdsmen)
3
2
2
2
2
2
5
2
1
4
(1 – Non-Existent / Not Known, 2 – Immature / Non-Effective, 3 – Workable / Effective, 4 –
Good, 5 – Excellent)
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5.5 Potential proliferation risk, and theft pathways in enrichment reduction
Most of the recent efforts in in counterterrorism and protection of nuclear materials considers the
interest and the ability of terrorist group to manufacture nuclear weapon from acquired SQ of
nuclear material. But the present work takes the initiative to evaluate and evaluate risk using the
NIRR-1 facility based on the outcome of a neutronic model developed from the operating
parameters and history of the facility. The amount of fission products that can be released if the
facility is attacked is the major interest because the amount of plutonium that can be produced
throughout the life time of operation of the core cannot produce the quantity required to
manufacture any weapon.
The assessment of capabilities of the non-state actors within the Nigeria territory, countries
having established boarders with Nigeria and most especially those that have their operating base
near the NIRR-1 facility are equally assessed.
Risk evaluation, communication and assessment cannot be completed without the assessment of
critical factors for protection system. Physical protection system as well must consider the role
an insider could playacting alone or in collaboration with a potential adversary.

5.5.1 Insider threat and mitigation
Trusted personnel remain the most dangerous and the greatest risk to any organization because of
their knowledge and privileged access to equipment, document and the facility in general. They
may use their position to carry out espionage, theft of intellectual property and sabotage [93]
[94]. Because of peculiarity of the NIRR-1 facility in terms of location, there must be adequate
culture of security and safeguards to prevent elicitation outside influence on the facility
personnel
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Undesirable consequences can result from the theft of a nuclear material from any facility that
can have grave psychological impact, economic loss, environmental damage, and loss of critical
infrastructure as well as loss of life may be in the process of responding and neutralizing the
adversary there may be shot outs that could result to loss of life and secondly, if the response was
not able to neutralize the adversary, they may intentionally use the stolen material as a weapon to
produce; RDD or Radiological Emitting Device (RED) that could be used to cause maximum
harm to the people and environment. It must be noted that the conversion program only reduces
the enrichment in fuel but does not mitigate unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft or
unauthorized transfer of radioactive sources. There the establishment of facility protection must
come alongside the program to prevent the threat of unauthorized access by both insider and
outsiders. A graded approach to prevent and protect against the insider was developed by the
IAEA as shown in (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3. The IAEA graded approach for preventing and protecting against insiders
Source: [94]
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5.6 Adversary Sequence Diagram
The security risk assessment and evaluation techniques for the hypothetical facility design in
(Figure 5.4) was carried out using with the concept of adversary path to model the PPS, the
assessment considered the fact that adversary from outside will transverse several layers of
security.
The design breakdown echoed on timely identification of clandestine activities and the needed
detection as well as delay elements up to the time when the guards must respond to interrupt as
well as call for external backup if there is need for intervention before the adversary gets to the
target. In addition, early detection elements were considered near the perimeter fence while
equally adding delay elements near the target. (Figure 5.5) represents the timeline for an
adversary to complete task (Tc) as well as the timeline for the facility protection system to be
activated against the adversary (TI). In this design, detection and response time is expected to be
less than time it will take the adversary to complete any task through the Most Vulnerable Path
(MVP). Beside this the PPS system must be such that can delay adversary timeline as soon as the
first alarm (To) is heard and assessed (TA). All actions and consequences are ranked and
represented as the risk equation [95]. The ranking system is accomplished by accumulating the
probabilities of all timely detection elements along a path and referred to as the probability of
interruption (PI). Consequently, all detection must occur before the Critical Detection Point
(CDP), which is the point where the last timely detection element is located before an adversary
completes action. Respectively, each of the elements is associated with a probability of detection
as well as a non-detection probability represented by equation 5.4.
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Figure 5.4. Hypothetical reactor layout design

Figure 5.5. Adversary Task completion timeline
Source: [95]
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𝑗

𝑗

𝛽𝐷 = 1 − 𝑃𝐷

equation 5.4

where,
𝑗

𝛽𝐷 = Non-detection probability of each detection element
Equally, there is the probability that an adversary will not be detected all the numerus
independent elements before the timeline, Tc either by a system breakdown or evasion. The
probabilities or product of this non-detection for those elements
𝐽

𝑗

𝛽𝐷 = ∏𝑗=1 𝛽𝐷

equation 5.6

For a well-designed PPS, the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼 ) is represented by:
𝑃𝐼 = 1 - 𝛽𝐷

equation 5.7

From equation 5.7, the risk to the facility can be derived from applying equation 5.8 when

𝑅 = 𝑃𝐴 (1 − 𝑃𝐼 𝑃𝑁 )𝐶

equation 5.8

where
–

PA is the probability that an adversary will attack a facility along a path,

–

PI is the probability of interruption of the adversary along that path,

–

PN is the probability of neutralization given that we have interrupted the
adversary in a timely manner, and

–

C is the consequence of adversary success

Adequate level of security systems must be placed on all critical infrastructure using a
multilayered combination of human and material resources [96] to protect assets. Such design
may employ the use of modeling and simulation tools in a way that brings together various
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elements of security system to achieve desired result [97]. Several organizations including the
US DOE has employed the use of simulation tools like the Estimate of Adversary Sequence
Interruption (EASI) and other software to develop as well as evaluate attack scenarios as a means
of assessment of facility PPS [98]
According to the IAEA [99], physical protection system must be designed to protect all nuclear
facilities, radioactive materials, and services as well as any critical infrastructures from
consequences of unwarranted acts of sabotage. But the design must consider very clearly and
succinctly the understanding of all threat, vulnerabilities, likely adversary both within (insider) or
from outside of the facility. As well, the design must convey the ability to detect, delay and
response including the requisite emergency plans to mitigate the challenges that may arise from
such malicious actions.
This research exploited the quantitative method of analyzing the combination of probability of
delay, detection and response designed with 95% statistical degree of confidence to evaluate the
effectiveness of the PPS for the hypothetical facility in (Figure 5.4) using the EASI software was
designed by the Sandia National Laboratory to evaluate PPS design by proving scenarios of path
and conditions of vulnerability as well as threat within a facility [95]. In view of the heat map of
terrorist attacks shown in (Figure 5.2) as well as the threat and capability table of non-state actors
in (Table 5.4), a sequence of nine adversary layered event was developed using the hypothetical
facility in (Figure 5.4) as shown in (Figure 5.6).
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Cut wire fence

Run to Vital Area

Open outer Door

Open inner door

Run to protected area

Penetrate protected area

Penetrate Reactor room

Run towards target

Sabotage target

Figure 5.6. Sequence and adversary path layer of event for hypothetical facility
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The evaluation of the facility PPS sequence of nine adversary layered event was carried out in
two scenarios; (i) an adversary working without any assistance from an insider and (ii) an
adversary assisted by an insider. The model was designed to achieve a 95% statistical degree of
confidence of effectiveness of guard’s communication after the first alarm is received, equally
the response force time (RFT) was set at 270 seconds limit to intercept adversary actions. In
addition, the EASI design uses an estimated ± 30% standard deviation for each mean value.
(Figure 5.7) describes the scenario without any insider collusion and from the result obtained
using the EASI model, the probability of interruption (𝑃𝐼 ) obtained was 0.9472. From the design,
the total response force time used in the design was 270 seconds, while the adversary total time
was 586 seconds. Based on this PPS, the adversary will be interrupted and neutralized on the 7th
path which is the critical detection point (CDP), this is referred to as the point within the system
design along the adversary path where the projected delay exceeds the response force time. From
this PPS, the time remaining after interruption is the difference between the adversary task time
ATT (586) and the response force time (270) is 316 seconds.
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Figure 5.7. Facility EASI estimate of Probability of Interruption without insider collusion
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Consequently, (Figure 5.8) was developed to describe another scenario with insider collusion, it
was assumed that the insider collusion adversely affected the effectiveness of the security
detection system within the facility. As seen from (Figure 5.8), most delay elements were greatly
reduced due to the insider assistance, which gave the adversary an advantage of shorter time to
beat the delay systems in place as well as lesser time to reach the target. The adversary total time
for Table 5.5 was 269 seconds while the response force time was 270 seconds. Accordingly,
since the adversary task time is lesser than the response force time, the probability of interruption
(𝑃𝐼 ) obtained from the EASI model was 0.3812 which is an indication of an ineffective PPS,
hence the response force will not be able to neutralize the adversary.

Figure 5.8. Facility EASI estimate of Probability of Interruption with insider collusion
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Chapter 6
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS AND HOW IT AFFECTS
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM PLANNING, APPROACH, AND
OPERATION
The ORIGEN suit of SCALE code was used to generate a wide-ranging radionuclide
composition for the plutonium and uranium isotopic composition as well as their corresponding
radioactivity. Inventories for three material groups; fission products, actinides including their
daughter isotopes. The mass in gram and activities in curies were tracked and documented. From
the result as well, a 3-D image for the core of the reactor was generated.
As a first step in this study, SCALE code was developed from an existing MCNP input for the
study and evaluation of the HEU core performance as well as the corresponding LEU
replacement fuel. The plutonium balance in both the HEU and LEU simulated core were
analyzed to predict the extent of weapon-usable materials that will be left in the spent fuel after
some predetermined Effective Full Power Day (EFPD). The rated power obtained from the
safety analysis report (SAR) were used in the simulation for both the HEU and the LEU core 30
KW and 34 KW respectfully. Equally obtained from the SAR was the choice of UO2 Zircaloy
fuel replacement at 12.5% enrichment. However, the input to the SCALE has a flexibility of
modification depending on the enrichment level of choice for further simulation. From the result
obtained from the simulation which is further discussed later in this chapter, the quantity of
plutonium produced at lower enrichment in the global evaluation of the non-proliferation in
research and test reactors should be revisited if the for all purpose and intent, the conversion
program is set to achieve the objectives set forward.

70

A characteristic assessment to evaluate the technical and safety risk was developed using
neutronic model derived from the unit cell/rod design shown in (Figure 6.1 and 6.2). The reactor
burnup was carried out the TRITON depletion model to determine and estimate the fission
products and the actinides, above all the materials classified as special nuclear materials (SNM)
that are important to production of weapon-usable material of any type and form
The results obtained for seven days TRITON RUN from a unit rod showed that the quantity of
plutonium was more at higher nominal power. From the result, it can be observed that; for all
intent and purpose, risk evaluation restricted to reduced enrichment in all test and research
reactor is not complete not minding the additional vulnerabilities assessment in the type, location
and size of facility as well as capabilities of terrorist groups operating near the facility or state
that may be seeking nuclear materials.

Clad thickness

Fuel Material
2.75 mm

Mater
ial

Fuel diameter

Figure 6.1. Top view of material arrangements in NIRR-1-unit cell
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Channel water
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Figure 6.2. Lateral view of simulated NIRR-1unit rod design

Equally, the 3-D model of the NIRR-1 developed with the GeeWiz is shown in (Figure 6.3)
while (Figure 6.4) is the 3-D model of the core surrounded by the beryllium reflector as well as
the upper beryllium shim plate and the lower or bottom beryllium reflector slab.
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Figure 6.3. 3-D model of NIRR core with SCALE/GeeWiz

Figure 6.4. 3-D model of NIRR-1 with SCALE/GeeWiz
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6.1.1 NIRR-1 burnup and activity related to risk
The initial result from the unit rod burnup was used to investigate the amount and specific
activity of selected nuclides of uranium and plutonium isotopes at the end of variable
predetermined years of burnup. According to Mark et al [100], critical mass of any reactor grade
plutonium metal after discharge is more reactive than any weapon grade uranium. For every
weapon grade material, it is expected that a certain amount of isotope composition of plutonium
is present as highlighted in (Table 6.1) [100]. Subsequently, for safeguards, it is expected that
any measured level above the facility or levels should draw the attention of the state regulators or
the IAEA.

Table 6.1. Estimated plutonium isotopic composition in weapon grade materials
Grade
Super-grade
Weapon-grade
Reactor-grade
MOX-grade
FBR blanket
Source: [100]

238

Pu

0.00012
0.013
0.019
-

Isotope
240
Pu
Pu
0.98
0.02
0.938
0.058
0.603
0.243
0.404
0.321
0.96
0.04
239

241

Pu

0.0035
0.091
0.178
-

242

Pu

0.00022
0.050
0.078
-

The manufacture of a nuclear weapon may be quite expensive [101], production of nuclear
explosives takes about 35 pounds of 235U or 9 pounds of 239Pu [102]. It takes more effort to
produce, but not as much to invade by terrorist or disperse radioactive materials. Besides, 239Pu is
widely considered by the public to be the worst of all transmutation products with half-life of up
to 24,100 years. The element emits an alpha radiation which is very highly ionizing. It is
produced in nuclear reactor by neutron capture of 238U [100] continuously irrespective of the
level of enrichment.
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Risk from the radiotoxic elements were quantified by simulating the quantities in grams and
curies of the nuclides of uranium and plutonium isotopes from the decay and production of
nuclides for seven days to identify the most weapon-usable materials that can be produced per
operational time of the NIRR-1 research reactor. As part of the IAEA requirements for peaceful
application of nuclear technologies, it is required that states prevent the malicious use of nuclear
materials under the “prudent management practices” as well as encourages the classification of
materials with respect to element, isotope, quantity and irradiation [68].
This will be a valuable information required by the IAEA as part of declaration and safeguards
verification. In addition, it will be valuable for evaluation of risk considering all identified
vulnerabilities, security and safeguards. As well, (Figure 6.5 and 6.8) results were obtained for
quantity in grams (g) as well as the specific activity in curies (ci) respectfully, the activity
obtained in (Figure 6.8) is important for planning emergency and the inherent in the accidental or
deliberate dispersal of such material.
The nuclide concentration of both the HEU and the LEU were simulated for a week worth
operation of approximately 2.5 hours of operation per day. The average burnup from the
simulated result was 0.021 GW/MTIHM for the HEU while that obtained for LEU was 0.014.
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Figure 6.5. List of selected nuclides volumetric concentration (g) (unit rod HEU)

Figure 6.6. Fission products after seven day (g) (unit rod HEU)
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Figure 6.7. Actinides elements after seven day (g) (unit rod HEU)

Figure 6.8. List of selected nuclides concentration (Ci) (unit rod HEU)
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Figure 6.9. Seven days operational decay (unit rod, HEU)

Figure 6.10. List of selected nuclides volumetric concentration (g) (unit rod LEU)
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Figure 6.11. Fission products after seven day (g) (unit rod LEU)

Figure 6.12. Actinides elements after seven day (g) (unit rod LEU)
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Figure 6.13. Seven days operational radioactive nuclide activity decay (unit rod, LEU)

Figure 6.14. List of selected nuclides concentration (Ci) (unit rod LEU)

80

The production of isotopes of plutonium in large quantity will be the most significant attributes
of any proliferating state. In the simulated output, the quantity of 239Pu balance after 7 days of
operation was recorded in both HEU and LEU output. (Figure 6.15) shows the quantity of 239Pu
in both HEU and the LEU fuels simulated. Evidently, from the values obtained from the plot,
239

Pu balance for LEU fuel was 1.49g while HEU was 0.118g.

Quantity of weapon-usable material (239Pu after 7 days burn up)
1.6
pu239 (LEU)

1.4

pu239 (HEU)

Linear (pu239 (LEU))

1.2

mass (grams)

1
0.8
0.6

0.4
0.2
0
0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

Irradiation time (days)

Figure 6.15. Plutonium (239Pu) balance after 7 days burn up HEU versus LEU

Equally, the isotopic quantity of selected uranium and plutonium isotopes for both HEU and the
LEU were simulated for 1-year worth operation of approximately 2.5 hours of operation per day
for 5 days a week for the three-material groups; fission, actinides and the light elements are
highlighted in (Figure 6.22).
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Figure 6.16. Fission products after 1-year operating time for unit rod (HEU)

Figure 6.17. Actinides after 1-year operating time for unit rod (HEU)
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Figure 6.18. 1- year operational radioactive nuclide activity decay (unit rod, HEU)

Figure 6.19. Fission products after 1-year operating time for unit rod (LEU)
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Figure 6.20. Actinides after 1-year operating time for unit rod (LEU)

Figure 6.21. 1-year operational radioactive nuclide activity (Unit rod, LEU)
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Furthermore, the characteristic assessment was carried out using same neutronic model derived
from the unit cell/rod design shown in (Figure 6.1 and 6.2) to determine and estimate of the
materials classified as special nuclear materials (SNM) that are important to production of
weapon-usable material or dispersal agent. The result obtained as well showed that the quantity
of plutonium was more when the LEU was simulated, apparently as mentioned in chapter 1 that
the increase in 238U isotopic content in HEU from 9.0 wt% to 87.05 wt% in LEU will produce
more weapon-usable 239Pu in spent fuel of the LEU, equally from the values obtained from the
plot, 239Pu balance for LEU fuel was 95.089g while HEU was 7.652g shown in (Figure 6.22).
Consequently, the fact that this noticeable increase will give rise to weapon-usable 239Pu in spent
fuel of the LEU should be a big source of concern for the enrichment reduction program as well
as international safeguards and accounting for nuclear materials. Based on the quantity of
weapon-usable 239Pu obtained from both simulations, it is suggested that risk evaluation
restricted to reduced enrichment in all test and research reactor is not complete, not minding the
additional vulnerabilities assessment in the type, location and size of facility as well as
capabilities of terrorist groups operating near the facility or state that may be seeking nuclear
materials.
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Figure 6.22. Plutonium (239Pu) balance after 7 days burn up HEU versus LEU

Table 6.2. Plutonium isotopes with their properties including Americium-241
Isotopes

Half-life
(years)
238
Pu
87.7
239
Pu
24,100
240
Pu
6,560
241
Pu
14.4
242
Pu
376,000
241
Am
430
Source: [100]

Bare critical mass
(Kg, 𝛼- phase)
10
10
40
10
100
100

Spontaneous fission
neutrons (gm-s)-1
2.6 x 103
22 x 10-3
0.91 x 103
49 x 10-3
1.7 x 103
1.2

Decay heat
(watts Kg-1)
560
1.9
6.8
4.2
0.1
114
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6.1.2 Safeguards of nuclear material in Nigeria
The NIRR-1 facility is regulated by the Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA)
established by an Act of parliament (Act 19 of 1995) to ensure the protection of life, health,
property and the environment as well as ensuring that Nigeria’s national and international
security, safety and safeguards obligations are met. The NNRA is also charged with the powers
to categorize and license facilities and services involving ionizing radiation. Under the IAEA
safeguards, Nigeria has ratified and domesticated most of the existing Legally Binding
International Instruments as well as Legally Non-binding International Instruments such as the;
the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) as well as the Amendment
to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; and International Convention for
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) as
well as the Protocol Additional to the CSA, UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, the
Pelindaba Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free zone, the IAEA Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance to the Code on
Import and Export of Radioactive Material.
Accordingly, the objectives of safeguards application to the NIRR-1 facility and general nuclear
and radiological practice in Nigeria is directed towards the regulating and mitigation of
accidental harmful exposure as well as preventing amongst others the malicious use of
radioactive sources; unauthorized access, damage, loss, theft and unauthorized transfer of nuclear
materials, services and technology [103].
87

Safeguards for the NIRR-1 must continue to evolve in the protection of personnel, public and the
environment. (Figure 6.23.) highlights list of selected nuclides and their corresponding activity
after 10-years of the unit core operation. During regulatory or IAEA verification, any change in
background that is different from reported measurement would then be classified as an indication
of malicious or clandestine operation either by the facility or the state by extension. The list
could as well serve a measure of emergency preparedness and planning for the facility.

Figure 6.23. Initial activity of selected radioisotopes and their corresponding initial activities in
Bq
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The security risk and safeguards of the reactor under conversion and the facility were evaluated,
gaps were identified by comparing this research with other methods adopted in the evaluation of
security risk. Results obtained from the SCALE and ORIGEN simulation showed at higher
thermal power of the candidate LEU at 12.5% enrichment produces more amount of weaponusable materials from the reactor at varying time intervals of operation.
The weapon-usable 239Pu balance for LEU fuel compared to the HEU was measured for 4 EFPD
(one week) and the value obtained in both cases were highlighted in (Figure 6.15.) as 1.49g and
0.118g respectively. Equally, the 239Pu balance for LEU fuel compared to the HEU measured for
336 EFPD (one year) and the value obtained in both cases were highlighted in (Figure 6.22.) as
95.089g and 7.652g respectively due to the increase in 238U isotopic content in HEU from 9.0
wt% to 87.05 wt% in LEU. Consequently, this noticeable increase will continue to increase
linearly with each day of operations and subsequently increasing the production of weaponusable 239Pu in spent fuel of the LEU. This should be a big source of concern for the enrichment
reduction program as well as international safeguards and accounting for nuclear materials.
Similarly, this research showed that methodologies for risk evaluation should not be based on the
technical background of a would-be adversary as the only measure of risk metric because the
amount of weapon-usable material may not be adequate to manufacture any weapon but may
cause consequential environmental challenges if dispersed.
Based on this, results from this research established a criteria and requirements for risk
evaluation, security, safeguards that is expected to be of tremendous benefit for a global
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perspective security, safeguards and general physical protection system to support the ongoing
enrichment reduction program as well as supporting safeguards for transport security when
importing the LEU core as well as returning the present HEU core.
The simulation carried out in this research was targeted towards helping to improve the safety

performance, inventory, identification of actinides and fission products as well as to support the
regulatory changes that comes with any conversion process while in addition to the advancement
of a new legal framework for safeguards and security of nuclear materials, verification, including
material control and accountancy for the HEU and new LEU in Nigeria.
Assessments of proliferation risk, to security and safeguards of storage and transportation of
unirradiated and irradiated HEU and LEU fuel will be improved with the knowledge of quantity
of materials generated by the simulation for the facility.
Under this assessment, technical risk, insider risk, outsider collusion, terrorist attack or invasion,
the vulnerability assessment and above all perceived acquisition pathways for the hypothetical
facility representative of the NIRR-1 facility were carried out using unique Nigeria country
circumstances based on existing location of the NIRR-1. Also, the proposed 10MW research reactor will
be a beneficiation of the security and adversary path analysis developed in this research, because of the
proposed location in the north central region of Nigeria.
The result generated from the SCALE and ORIGEN will provide some generic analyses in support of

the ongoing core conversion of HEU to LEU in Nigeria. It was established that the NIRR-1
enrichment reduction will attract additional verification challenges based on the HEU core
removal and the new LEU core replacement because the operating history will change for the
new LEU fuel as well as the requirements for the security and safeguard from the view of the
quantity of weapon-usable plutonium that will be left after the conversion.
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Above all, the cost of the enrichment reduction in each facility must be economically justified
based on facility assessment.

7.1 Recommendations
Continuous review of risk assessment is encouraged and should reflect security culture, level of
education and access to education, government bureaucracy, perceived corruption index that will
be reflected in the facility services as well as personnel engagement.
Based on the ongoing enrichment reduction, there must be adequate improvement in the
regulatory oversight in a way that reflects the present status of the nuclear program in Nigeria.
Equally, safeguards verification and inspectors’ skills that matches the present operating
conditions of nuclear services and facilities in Nigeria must be put in place.
Nigeria as well as other states implementing the enrichment reduction should endeavor to reach
out to the international community to adapt and domesticate best practices, models and strategies
that accommodate unique country circumstances, including but not limited to their present fuel
cycle, plans for future nuclear power plants and research facilities, budget, education
infrastructure, government bureaucracy, international agreements and information management
systems for implementing their national safeguards inspection program.
When considering facility security and safeguards design, it is important to establish a threshold
at a level that attracts a very high consequence as a means of dissuading a potential insider or an
invader from accomplishing set ulterior motives at research reactor facilities. Nonetheless, the
consequence must be such that emergency plan and intervention or arrangements by the facility
or state can easily be neutralized when activated against the set threshold.
Domestic safeguards and verification protocols oversite in the application of safeguards and
material accounting for the facility and country at large must be enhanced.
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There must be a continuous review of the inventory management system, potential proliferation
risk assessments, facility specific theft pathways analysis and vulnerability assessment for the
improvement of detection and interdiction. Equally, there must be a continuous review of the
inventory management system, potential proliferation risk assessments, facility specific theft
pathways analysis and vulnerability assessment for the improvement of detection and
interdiction and counterterrorism policy that considers peculiar facility situation, operation and
infrastructure. Additionally, the present acquisition pathway analysis (APA) used in this research
could be adopted to develop information for the State Level Approach (SLA) for the LEU fuel.
The present safety analysis report is outdated and must be reviewed to reflect the new operating
history, security and safeguards requirement at the facility

7.2 Future work
Develop an adequate data profile to mitigate insider and continuous review of the facility design
basis threat.
Develop a model that will determine the fuel requirements and consumption rate of the reactor
under the Material Control and Accounting.
Based on the challenges of running the SCALE code at full core for the 10-year period of the
core life, there will be a genuine need for further neutronic analysis to reflect the reality of the
life time of the fresh core when more accurate operational data from the is available.
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Appendix 1
Generic Base parameters - HEU (UAl alloy) versus LEU (UO2) candidate fuel. Source: [37]
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Appendix 2 Categorization of Nuclear Materials
Material
1. Plutonium a

Form
Unirradiated b

2. Uranium-235 (235U)

Unirradiated b
– Uranium
enriched to 20%
235U or more
5 kg or more

Category I
2 kg or more

Category II
Less than 2 kg
but more than
500 g

Category IIIc
500 g or less
but more than 15 g

5Kg or more

Less than 5 Kg
but more than 1
kg

1Kg or less but
more than 15 g

10Kg or more

Less than 10 Kg but
more than 1 Kg

– Uranium
enriched to 10%
235U but less
than 20% 235U
– Uranium
enriched above
natural, but less
than 10%
235U

3. Uranium-233 (233U)

4. Irradiated fuel
(The categorization of
irradiated fuel in the table
is based
on international transport
considerations. The State
may
assign a different category
for domestic use, storage
and
transport taking all
relevant factors into
account.)

Unirradiated b

10 Kg or more

2 kg or more

Less than 2 kg
but
more than 500 g

500 g or less but
more than 15 g

Depleted or
natural
uranium, thorium
or low
enriched fuel
(less than
10% fissile
content) d, e

a. All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.
b. Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 Gy/h. (100 rad/h) at 1 m
unshielded.
c. Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with
prudent management practice.
d. Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a
different category of physical protection.
e. Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category
level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 1 Gy/h (100 rad/h) at one meter unshielded.
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